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Our age is, in especial degree, the age of criticism, and to criticism

everything must submit.
-Immanuel
INTRODUCTION:

Kant'

LAW REFRACTED THROUGH THE PRISM
OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

In recent years legal scholarship has undergone changes so fundamental as to suggest the need for a reassessment of law as an academic
discipline, as a subject of study, and as an intellectual institution. These
changes have been wrought in part by a generation of new legal scholars
with professional academic training in the humanities and social sciences,
and in part by others who undoubtedly would have entered such disciplines in more auspicious times. Where legal scholars once confined
themselves to modest contributions on such topics as The Law of Ponds 2

and The Meaning of Fire in an InsurancePolicy, 3 this new generation of

legal academicians is weighing in with elaborate, highly nuanced, and
intensely ambitious treatises-published in the leading law reviews-on
such heady subjects as The Metaphysics of American Law4 and The Politics of Reason.5 Even relatively established scholars, who once were con-

tent to tinker with refinements in judicial doctrine, are today viewing
judicial decisionmaking-particularly that of the U.S. Supreme Courtfrom a new, more dramatic, and more portentous perspective. They are

"set[ting] before us a constitutional epic of tragic conflict, along with a
rich and evocative language with which to comprehend that epic."' 6 And

I should like to thank Frank Allen, Reinhard Baule, Peter Blanck, Robert Brumbaugh, Delf
Buchwald, Ralf Dreier, William Ewald, Kermit Hall, David Luban, John Merryman, Bob Moffat,
John Monahan, Tom Morawetz, Linda Morton, Wolfgang Naucke, Dennis Patterson, Krzysztof
Pleszka, Richard Posner, David Rosenhan, Frederick Schauer, Chris Slobogin, John Stick, Mark
Tushnet, Rulon Wells, and Walter Weyrauch for helpful comments, suggestions, and criticisms.
Lisa Besserman, Ladd Brown, Jane Hicks, Scott Lippman, Kim Scalia, Ray Washington, and Nina
Zollo provided valuable research assistance. The University of Florida College of Law supported
much of the research on this Article with Summer Research Appointments; research and writing in
Germany were conducted under the auspices of the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung and the Universities of Gittingen and Frankfurt. I thank all these institutions for their generous support. Any
errors I alone, in my sole indiscretion, have committed. I am particularly grateful for the help of
those who disagree with the views expressed in this Article.
This Article is dedicated to the memory of Michael D. Bayles, 1941-1990.
I. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON at xi (1781).
2. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Law of Ponds, 3 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1889).
3. Edwin H. Abbot, Jr., The Meaning ofFire in an InsurancePolicy Against Loss or Damage
by Fire, 24 HARV. L. REv. 119 (1910).
4. Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1985).
5. James Boyle, The Politicsof Reason: CriticalLegal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133
U. PA. L. REv. 685 (1985).
6. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV.4, 4 n.1 (1986).
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they are setting before us a more serious and sustained scholarly focus on
judicial opinions than has ever been seen before.
As I see it, these developments present a dual aspect: First, contemporary legal scholars are moving away from traditional, doctrinal scholarship and its methodological assumptions. The best explanation for this
departure and evasion is to be found in the theory of intellectual influence and revisionism. 7 At the same time, they are moving toward other
academic disciplines and the forms of external (non-legal) scholarly authority those disciplines seem to offer.
Legal study, teaching, and scholarship have been immensely enriched by the outpouring of interdisciplinary legal work in the 1980s. In
many ways, this work represents, in law, the intellectual development of
our time. Interdisciplinary legal work has now attained a level of maturity and development comparable to that of other established subfields of
law. It is only to be expected that a period of reappraisal, reassessment,
and selective criticisms of its overextensions will follow this evident popular success.
When a field of study and scholarship has become sufficiently established and institutionalized to withstand constructive criticism, the highest compliment one can pay it is to subject it to the most rigorous
applicable standards of intellectual validity. At this relatively advanced
stage in the interdisciplinary legal movement, one may be permitted the
assumption that its contributions can be assessed, not only in terms of
their enrichment of legal discourse, but also according to the criteria and
professional canons of the non-legal disciplines from which concepts and
methodologies have been "borrowed." It is on this basis that this Article
proceeds. Without in any way deemphasizing or discounting the vast
enrichment of law through its interdisciplinary associations, I take seriously the methodologies, working assumptions, and professional canons
that those other non-legal disciplines have developed and deployed over
lengthy periods of their history. Measured against these criteria, I find
that the legal "use" of those other disciplines is in many ways, and in
many instances, an "abuse" of them.8 This abuse has two distinct
7. See WALTER J. BATE, THE BURDEN OF THE PAST AND THE ENGLISH POET (1970); HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF POETRY (1973).

8. Cf Francis A. Allen, The Dolphin and the Peasant: Ill-Tempered, but Brief Comments on
Legal Scholarship, in PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN E.

CRIBBET 183, 189 (Peter Hay & Michael Hoeflich eds., 1988) ("[Plerhaps the most striking aspect of
the current fascination with high theory is the absence of what might be called a redeeming skepticism, a failure to be sufficiently concerned with the characteristic limitations of theoretical systems."); Mark Tushnet, Legal Scholarshipin the UnitedStates: An Overview, 50 MOD. L. REV. 804,
812 (1987) (The "search by leading legal scholars in the United States for foundations of the law in
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sources or causes: the particular characteristics of the non-legal disciplines involved; and the more notable peculiarities of law as an intellectual discipline, as a subject of scholarship, and as the social institution
called "adjudication."
As legal theorists have become increasingly trained in and familiar
with the methodologies of other disciplines, they have begun to acquire
"the ways of the scholar." It is only natural that they will seek for law
the forms of intellectual legitimacy and scholarly authority that those
other disciplines possess and that the legal discipline and profession so
conspicuously lack. 9 It is here, however, that they must necessarily be
disappointed. As I shall show, legal scholars today are, in effect, seeking
in philosophy and humanistic theory generally something that law cannot offer and cannot even tolerate: "intellectual authority," an external,
non-legal source of scholarly legitimacy.
This Article examines these developments, and it does so from a
particular angle: I focus on the use of humanistic theory-especially
philosophical theory, but also literary, cultural, and social theory-in
contemporary legal scholarship, with special reference to the intellectual
and institutional roles of the judiciary in our legal scheme. My thesis is
that because of the radically different structures of authority in law and
the humanities, the hope that humanistic theory will be able to provide a
source of intellectual authority for law is largely a vain one.
Part I of this Article begins the discussion with a brief and selective
contrast between contemporary legal scholarship and that of the late
nineteenth century. Part II develops an account of humanistic methodology that emphasizes the "intellectual authority" of original texts and
primary sources, but also explains the emergence of a distinctive humanistic skepticism of non-intellectual forms of authority. I then analyze the
very different relationship of the judiciary to the forms of "institutional
authority" that sustain its pronouncements. Part III documents my conclusions about the primarily institutional role of the judiciary through an
analysis of the main factors that affect judicial selection, appointment,
and confirmation. I then extend my analysis to the work of the judiciary
other disciplines... is usually a sort of scavenging, motivated by the lawyer's effort to find something in the discipline that will help solve a predefined problem, rather than by the discipline's own
definition of its problems and goals.").
9. See Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REV. 1351,

1351 (1986) ("After a century as an autonomous discipline, academic law in America is busily ran-

sacking the social sciences and the humanities for insights and approaches with which to enrich our
understanding of the legal system."); Joan C. Williams, CriticalLegal Studies" The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 430 (1987) (Contemporary
proponents of critical legal studies are "attempting... to reinterpret law and legal education in the
context of the most prestigious and authoritative intellectual currents available.").
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and demonstrate the very limited intellectual authority of judicial decisionmaking. This discussion bears importantly on my analysis of legal
scholarship because an improper conception of the judicial role often underlies legal theorizing. Finally, Part IV considers some prominent examples of contemporary legal scholarship in light of this Article's
analysis.

I. FROM THE LAW OF PONDS TO NOMOS AND NARRATIVE
[E]ach generation gets the past it deserves.
-- Grant Gilmore1°
A.

The "JudiciousScholarship" of the Late Nineteenth Century

In this Section I undertake a brief and selective survey of legal scholarship in the late nineteenth century. One purpose of this is to provide a
context for viewing contemporary legal scholarship. Use of a relatively
long-term perspective heightens the contrast between earlier periods and
our own, and allows the changes in legal scholarship to emerge most
dramatically. The late nineteenth century is a particularly significant period for this purpose, because it was then that the modem, student-edited
law reviews began, and it is also the period when Langdellian formalism,
or conceptualism, began to emerge as a paradigm for legal scholarship.
A secondary purpose is to provide a view of law as an intellectual discipline in comparison with other disciplines. Just as Dilthey sought the
"structure of the historical world" in the human sciences,1 1 I seek the
nature of law through the conditions of legal scholarship.
To peruse a nineteenth-century law review is to page through a
world that no longer exists and to re-acquaint oneself with a vision of
legal scholarship that has long since vanished. Legal scholarship has traditionally been conceived as a modest, unambitious enterprise. The doctrinal scholarship of the late nineteenth century is much like the work of
a good judge: It is "judicious," in the sense of being balanced, reasonable, moderate, temperate, and pragmatic; it is largely descriptive, respectful of previous authority, and faithful to existing law; and it
recommends only modest improvements in the law-"the proposal of
some well-crafted incremental change in the law which is the hallmark of
12
the excellent judge."
10. GRAN'r GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 102 (1977).
11. See WILHELM DILTHEY, Der AuJbau der Geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften, in 7 GESAMMELTE SCHRIFrEN (6th ed. 1973).
12. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2439, 2442 (1987)
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The proposition that legal scholarship has undergone fundamental
changes in the past century or so may strike one initially as an almost
unfairly "easy" thesis. But it is by no means a thesis upon which there is
universal agreement. Before proceeding to my main theme, therefore, it
may be useful to dispose of the counter-thesis that legal scholarship has
not changed appreciably. The introduction to a recent symposium maintains, under the title Plus ia Change... ?, that on the subject of legal
13
scholarship, "there is little new under the sun."
I think this thesis is wrong-demonstrably wrong. Perhaps the simplest and most dramatic demonstration to the contrary is to juxtapose
two issues of the Yale Law Journal,separated by almost 100 years. Here
are the contents of one of the issues:
Injunction in the Federal Courts
When May a Railroad Company Make Guaranties?
The Law of Icy Sidewalks in New York State
Some Questions Relating to the Measure of Damages in Street
Opening proceedings in New York City
And here are the contents of the other issue:
Unger's Philosophy: A CriticalLegal Study
CriticalLegal Studies and a Liberal Critic
Don't Know Much About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law and
Literature
The Structure of Blacktone's Commentaries
It is not much of a challenge to locate these two issues historically
(hint: The second issue also contains a student note entitled Figuringthe
Law: Holism and TropologicalInference in Legal Interpretation). The
discerning reader will have surmised that the first issue dates from the
late nineteenth century, 14 whereas the second is a product of the 1980s. 15
One remarks immediately on obvious differences in titles and subject
matter; these imply profound differences in what I shall term "intellectual ambitiousness" and in the authors' relatively theoretical or conceptual approaches. One remarks also that the 1980s authors are mostly not
[hereinafterBork Hearings](statement of George L. Priest); see also id. at 2440-43 (discussing differences between Judge Bork's legal scholarship and his judicial opinions); cf Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's
Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1983):
Progress occurred when the scholar (or the great judge or lawyer) discovered a previously
unrecognized principle, one that provided a simple and satisfying explanation for existing
decisions, and that at the same time reflected the slowly changing needs and conditions of
society. Such a principle, because immanent in decided cases, was already the law, so that

its articulation was an act of discovery, not one of illegitimate legislation.
Id. at 31.
13. Stephen B. Burbank, Introduction: "Plus ga Change... ?", 21 U. MICH. J.L. REP!. 509,
509 (1988).
14. 6 YALE L.J. 245 (1897).
15. 97 YALE L.J. 665 (1988).
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even law professors: One author is a tutor in philosophy;1 6 another is a
professor of religion. 17 These two authors discuss the "philosophy" of a
scholar who, though nominally a law professor, has also been described
as a "prophet, if not [a] messiah" (at least of the Critical Legal Studies
movement).18 A third author is a professor of English literature,1 9 who
criticizes the writings of a federal judge--the only one involved who has
a full-time legal occupation. 20 The federal judge, though, is best known
not for his judging, but for his work in law and economics; 21 in this case,
however, it is the judge's more recent delvings into law and literature
that are at issue. 22 These divergent intellectual pedigrees and persuasions
illustrate a third recent trend-one toward the use of non-legal sources
and materials in legal scholarship.
As for the 1897 Yale Law Journal, from today's perspective one is
struck immediately by the lack of intellectual ambitiousness, the lack of
conceptual or theoretical approaches, and the lack of non-legal sources
and materials. The one moderately ambitious article in scope and potential generality, Injunction in the Federal Courts, is barely seven pages
long. The Law of Icy Sidewalks in New York State is typical. The purpose of the article is "to recite briefly the present condition of the law of
the Empire State bearing on this interesting question": 23 whether a person injured as a result of falling on an icy sidewalk can recover from the
city where the accident occurred. It has commonly been assumed, the
author says, that our cities are some sort of "accident insurance companies to protect everyone against injuries occasioned by such accidents.
The decisions of our courts have, however, very properly held otherwise
."24 From the existing case law the author extracts two rules: (1) A
16. William Ewald, author of Unger's Philosophy: A CriticalLegal Study, was a Junior Research Fellow at The Queen's College, Oxford.
17. Cornel West, author of CLS and a Liberal Critic, is a Professor of Religion and Director of
the Afro-American Studies Program, Princeton University.
18. See Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773, 1781 (1987)
(discussing Roberto Unger); cf Richard Rorty, Unger, Castoriadis and the Romance of a National
Future, in 2 ESSAYS ON HEIDEGGER AND OTHERS: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 177, 177 (1991) ("Roberto Mangabeira Unger is a Brazilian philosopher."); see also Stephen Holmes, The Professor of
Smashing: The Preposterous PoliticalRomanticism of Roberto Unger, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 19,
1987, at 30 (reviewing ROBERTO M. UNGER, POLrTICS, A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY (1987)).
19. Stanley Fish, author of Don't Know Much About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law and
Literature, is Chairman of the English Department at Duke University and Professor of Law at the
Duke University School of Law.
20. Richard A. Posner is a Judge on the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
21. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986).

22. See

RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE:

A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION

(1988); Posner, supra note 9.
23. Loran L. Lewis, The Law of Icy Sidewalks in New York State, 6 YALE L.J. 258, 258 (1897).
24. Id.
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city is not liable in damages for any injuries resulting from slippery conditions caused by ice of recent formation; and (2) a city is not liable unless something about the sidewalk beyond mere slipperiness contributed
to the fall. All in five pages!
"Intellectual ambitiousness" is perhaps the vaguest and most general of my categories of comparison, but I think it captures something
important. The level of intellectual ambitiousness can be indicated indirectly by length, by title or topic, and by manner of treatment. Length is
obviously the crudest proxy, but it is interesting that the length of lead
articles in the HarvardLaw Review and the Yale Law Journalduring the
1890s averages only fifteen pages. 25 My favorite example of a short article is one that appeared in the 1893 American Law Register (the prede-"
cessor to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) entitled A New
Canon of ConstitutionalInterpretation-allnine pages of it!26 The inferences that can be made from length are obviously very limited, but I
think it is safe to say that a nine page article entitled "A New Canon of
Constitutional Interpretation" would be a virtual impossibility today. In
other interesting examples, Herbert H. Kellogg treats The Law of the
Telephone 27-including what appears to be the hottest issue of the day:
the effect of electric railways on telephonic transmission quality-all in
seven pages, which is nonetheless more space than Israel H. Peres needs
to dispose of "the general rules regulating" horse and buggy traffic in The
28
Law of the Road.
When one turns to titles, topics, and manner of treatment in the late
nineteenth century, one is struck by the preponderance of more modest
contributions to an empirical project. A sampling of titles by prominent
scholars is revealing: Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren on The
Law of Ponds 2 9 and The Watuppa Pond Cases;30 Joseph H. Beale, Jr. on
Tickets 3 1 and Taxation of Pipes in Public Streets;32 Samuel Williston on
Successive Promises of the Same Performance33 and The Right to Follow
25. This figure is based on a survey of 243 lead articles in the HarvardLaw Review from January 1890 to December 1899, and of 163 lead articles in the Yale Law Journal during the portion of
this period that it was in existence.
26. Richard C. McMurtrie, A New Canon of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 32 AM. L. REG. 1

(1893).
27.
28.
29.
30.
(1888).
31.
32.
33.
(1894).

Herbert H. Kellogg, The Law of the Telephone, 4 YALE L.J. 223 (1895).
Israel H. Peres, The Law of the Road, 4 YALE L.J. 137, 142 (1895).
Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Law ofPonds, 3 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1889).
Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Watuppa Pond Cases, 2 HARV. L. REV. 195
Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Tickets, 1 HARV. L. REv. 17 (1887).
Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Taxation of Pipes in PublicStreets, 4 HARV. L. REv. 83 (1890).
Samuel Williston, Successive Promises of the Same Performance, 8 HARV. L. REV. 27

Vol. 41:191]

HUMANISTIC THEORY IN LAW

Trust Property When Confused with Other Property;34 J.B. Ames on The
35
Disseisin of Chattels.
The legal issues treated in the late nineteenth century seem to arise
mainly out of pragmatic, everyday concerns. Lee Max Friedman's The
Bicycle and the Common Carrier,36 for example, appears to arise from a
pet peeve of the author, who vigorously defends the bicyclist's "right" to
bring his bicycle on a train. With the general rule in mind that a common carrier must transport a passenger's "ordinary baggage," the author
extracts from American and English case law a test for ordinary baggage,
including length of trip, purpose of travel, and even wealth of the passenger.37 Generally the bicyclist is traveling a short distance on the train,
such trains are slow-moving, and the bicyclist is usually traveling on a
Sunday or holiday, when the trains are not full. From this the author
concludes that, under "normal" circumstances, a bicycle is ordinary
38
baggage.
Since the late nineteenth century, legal scholarship has overwhelmingly meant the production and publication of articles engaged in doctrinal problem-solving. 39 The assumption of this form of legal scholarship
is that doctrinal problems admit of doctrinal solutions: There is no need
to go beyond or outside legal doctrine. Classical doctrinal scholarship
represents in this sense an "internal" perspective-internal to (case) law,
that is. 4 In The Bicycle and the Common Carrier,for example, the author begins with the premise that the advent of bicycling "furnishe[s]
another interesting example of what has long been the chief boast and
glory of our common law,-the flexibility of its precedents and the adapt'4 1
ability of its general principles to new facts and changed conditions."
34. Samuel Williston, The Right to Follow Trust Property When Confused with OtherProperty,2
HARv. L. REv. 28 (1888).
35. J.B. Ames, The Disseisin of Chattels, 3 HARv. L. REV. 23 (1889).
36. Lee M. Friedman, The Bicycle and the Common Carrier, 12 HARV. L. REV. 119 (1898).
37. IAl at 123 (IT]he Supreme Court of the United States has said that two hundred and
seventy-five yards of lace worth $10,000 [is ordinary baggage to] a Russian lady of fortune.") (citing
New York Cent. & H.R.R.R. v. Fraloff, 100 U.S. 24 (1879)).
38. Id at 124-25.
39. See ROBERT STEVENs, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s
TO THE 1980s, at 270-71 (1984).
40. See Grey, supra note 12, at 6 ("Classical orthodoxy was a particular kind of legal theory-a
set of ideas to be put to work from inside by those who operate legal institutions, not a set of ideas
about those institutions reflecting an outside perspective, whether a sociological, historical or economic explanation of legal phenomena."); cf id at 47 ("Classical scientists had purported to do no
more than make precise and scientific what had always been implicit in the substance of the common
law and the methods of common lawyers.").
41. Friedman, supra note 36, at 119.
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On such premises, a classic pattern or "formula" for doctrinal scholarship emerges: (1) state the problem; (2) propose a solution; (3) show how

42
the common law, properly reinterpreted, affords the proposed solution.
Here the influence of and connection with Langdellianism must be
noted. 43 A central implication of Langdell's case method was that, in the
study of law, one need not venture beyond appellate judicial opinions. 44
If, as Langdell postulated, law is a self-contained science, with the law
library as its "laboratory" 45 and cases as its "specimens," 46 one need only
study those appellate decisions. But, according to Richard Cosgrove:

"For all the emphasis on law as science, Langdell's declarations had the
curious result of limiting the field of legal inquiry rather than expanding
it.... [T]he Langdellian account of law implied a closed, logical legal

system where theoretical questions, if not exactly ruled out, never occupied a central position." 47
This deemphasis of theory implies a distrust of non-legal sources
and materials, perspectives, and frames" of reference. For the ultimate
ans*ers to all legal questions it was, according to Langdell, unnecessary
to ponder considerations of justice and social policy, or study the evolution of legal institutions in their social contexts, or consider other sources
of power and authority in social life, or even ascertain the actual effects

of law on people. It was, in short, "unnecessary to look with any particularity at what was actually going on in the real world"; 48 and it was
certainly not necessary to learn other disciplines or study non-legal
sources or materials.49 That is, Langdell taught ("with a vengeance,"

according to Lawrence Friedman 5o) that law is autonomous.
42. For another, more recent, paradigm of "the traditional goals of legal theory," see Robert
M. Hayden, Social-Theory and Legal Practice: Intuition,Discourse, and Legal Scholarship, 83 Nw.
U. L. REV.461, 461 (1989) (arguing that traditional goals are "to explain the existing law, to justify
legal principles, to critique existing doctrine, and to prescribe the directions that law ought to take").
43. On Langdellian scholarship, see GILMORE, supra note 10, at 47-48, 57-60; G. EDWARD
WHrrE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 31, 35 (1980); G. Edward White, The Impact ofLegal Science on
Tort Law, 1880-1910, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 225-26, 230 (1978).
44. See WHrrE, supra note 43, at 217.
45. Christopher C. Langdell,Address to HarvardLaw School Association, in A RECORD OF THE
COMMEMORATION, NOVEMBER FIFTH TO EIGHTH,

1886, ON

THE Two HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH

ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF HARVARD COLLEGE 84, 86-87 (Justin Winsor ed., 1887).
46. William A. Keener, Methods ofLegal Education, I YALE L.J. 143, 144 (1892) (discussing
the basic elements of the case method introduced at Harvard Law School).
47. RICHARD A. COSGROVE, OUR LADY THE COMMON LAW: AN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL

COMMUNITY 1870-1930, at 30 (1987).
48. GILMORE, supra note 10, at 56.
49. See COSGROVE, supra note 47, at 28.
50. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Law, Lawyers, andPopularCulture, 98 YALE L.J. 1579, 1581
(1989).
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B. The Current "ScholarshipAmok" Muck
By the 1950s, the average length of lead articles in the HarvardLaw
Review, the Yale Law Journal, and the University of Pennsylvania Law

Review had grown to about thirty-four pages, thirty-two pages, and
twenty-eight pages, respectively.5 1 By the 1980s, the comparable aver-

ages for these same law reviews had increased to sixty-five pages, fiftyfive pages, and seventy-one pages, respectively.5 2 Our contemporary
counterpart to the nine page piece from 1893 on A New Canon of ConstitutionalInterpretationis Jesse Choper's 212 page article (with 1611 footnotes) on Consequencesof Supreme CourtDecisions UpholdingIndividual
ConstitutionalRights, 53 or perhaps Donald Regan's 197 page article on
the dormant commerce clause,5 4 "probably the dullest subject in constitutional law."'55 (Regan's Introduction alone is nineteen pages long, and
contains five sections.5 6) G. Edward White has suggested that the inordinate length of modem law review articles may be due in part to a collapse of consensus; if nothing can be assumed as common knowledge and
taken for granted, then foundations must be relaid completely for every

argument. 57 My colleague Frank Allen has remarked on "the fascination
now revealed in some parts of the contemporary law school world with
the creation of intricate theoretical systems" 5 8 and observed:
Often when I have seen an article in which the fledgling author is attempting to expand a modest insight into at least galactic significance,
I am reminded of an incident in a Peter De Vries novel. A young man
51. The period surveyed was January 1950, through December 1959.
52. These figures are based on 104 articles for Harvard (including "Forewords"), 116 articles
for Yale, and 124 articles for Pennsylvania, from January 1980, to May (Harvard and Yale) and
April (Pennsylvania) 1989. See also W. Lawrence Church, A Pleafor ReadableLaw Review Articles,
1989 Wis. L. REv. 739, 740-41; Roger C. Cramton, "The Most Remarkable Institution" TheAmerican Law Review, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 6 n.24 (1986); Ira M. Ellman, A Comparison of Law Faculty
Production in Leading Law Reviews, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 681, 682 (1983); Michael J. Saks, Law
Journals: Their Shapes and Contents, 1960 and 1985 (Jan. 6, 1989) (draft report presented at the
Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Executive Committee's Symposium on Legal
Scholarship).
53. Jesse Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual Constitutional Rights, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1984).
54. Donald Regan, The Supreme Courtand State Protectionism: Making Sense ofthe Dormant
Commerce Clause, 84 MIcH. L. Rxv. 1091 (1986).
55. D.A.F., The Zapp Complex, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 13, 14 (1988). For other examples of
extremely long articles, see Dennis W. Arrow, Federal Question Doctrines and American Indian
Law, 14 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REv. 263 (1989) (127 pages with 796 footnotes); David M. Rabban, The
Emergence of Modern FirstAmendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1205 (1983) (151 pages with
923 footnotes); Steven L. Winter, The MetaphorofStanding and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40
STAN. L. REv. 1371 (1988) (146 pages and 790 footnotes).
56. See Regan, supra note 54, at 1091-109.
57. See WHITE, supra note 43, at 211-15.
58. Allen, supra note 8, at 188.
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much concerned with the problems of the Cosmos is consoled by a
female companion: "The Universe," she said, "isn't everything." 5 9

Geoffrey Miller has offered this summary:
These are times of ferment in legal academia. Standard doctrinal
analysis, which all but occupied the field a decade ago, is now retreat-

ing before the onslaught of all sorts of fancy new techniques. Strangesounding jargon imported from other disciplines-the Frankfurt
School of sociology, existentialism and phenomenology, neoclassical
economics and capital-markets theory-is appearing in the law jour-

nals. New ideas are spreading across the empire of doctrinal
analysis.6
Even the parodies of legal scholarship of the 1980s are revealing:
We write, um, about metalaw.
Metalaw! What's that?
Oh, it's about-you know-the deep structures of law, its normative

61
resonances, metaphorical power, and dialogic quality.
The term "postmodern" 62 nicely suggests the plight of scholarship
that has arrived, very late in the day, at a field that has already been
thoroughly and exhaustively tilled by others. And there are suggestions
that even postmodernism may have arrived too late. 63 In an overall view,
Paul Brest suggests that "the current ferment in legal theory" amounts to
attacks on "the self-congratulatory and complacent reign of 'legal process.' "64 After the Legal Process project of the 1950s and 1960s had
attained a certain state of development and completion, the question began to arise with particular urgency: What is left to do? Legal Process
has run its course. In order to carve out creative space for themselves,
contemporary legal scholars are forced-by default, and at all costs-to
59. Id at 192 (quoting PETER DE VRIES, THE TUNNEL OF LOVE 108 (1958)).
60. Geoffrey Miller, A Rhetoric of Law, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 247, 247 (1985) (reviewing JAMES
B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTrUrTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF

LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY (1984)).
61. Peter H. Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More EmpiricalResearch?, 39 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 323, 336 (1989).
62. For a general discussion of postmodernity, see JORGEN HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL
DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY (Frederick Lawrence trans., 1987); JEAN FRANgOIS LYOTARD, THE
POSTMODERN CONDITION (1984); see also David Luban, LegalModernism, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1656,
1656 (1986) (arguing that Critical Legal Studies "is to legal theory as modernist art was to traditional art").
63. See The New Public Interest Law: Strategies for Revitalizing Legal Activism in the '90s
(New Public Interest Law Conference, New College Law School, San Francisco, Jan. 7-8, 1990) (a
conference going, inter alia, "Beyond Post-Modernism"); cf ROGER KIMBALL, TENURED RADICALS 149 n.* (1990) ("One may safely hazard that the nonsensical phrasepostcontemporarywas the
result of a search for something even more up to date, more fashionable, than postmodern .... ).
For an old-fashioned analysis of the pathological aspects of post-postmodernity, see Soren Kierkegaard, The Rotation Method, in 1 ErrHER/OR 279 (David F. Swenson & Lillian M. Swenson trans.,
1944).
64. Paul Brest, Interpretationand Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765, 765 (1982).
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do something else or, in any event, something different. This is the "negative moment" (to use a Hegelian term) in the contemporary scholarly
situation; here the movement is viewed in its aspect as a movement away
from something:
It is essential to this task and to this form of scholarship that the
writer be skeptical of previous learning and to challenge what is the
accepted wisdom. Indeed, to assert the primacy of his or her own
ideas, the scholar must insist that the accepted wisdom is of little value
at all.... [L]egal scholars, if65they are to make any mark whatsoever,
must be hostile to authority.
As I have suggested, this phenomenon can best be explained in
terms of the theory of intellectual influence and revisionism. This theory
has been expounded and elaborated in the area of poetic influence, and I
think the situation is formally and structurally the same for legal scholars
of the 1980s. W. Jackson Bate has explored the melancholy that poets of
the Enlightenment faced in trying to wrest themselves free of the embarrassment of riches deposited before them by the ancients and the Renaissance masters. 66 Harold Bloom has carried the theme further in
discussing the "anxiety of influence" that strong poets feel as they attempt to step out of the shadows of powerful-indeed, overwhelmingpoetic predecessors and say something new. 67 Legal scholarship of the

1980s exhibits all the symptoms of an "anxiety of influence," and for
good reasons: "There is no credit given in academics for the proposal of
some well-crafted incremental change in the law ....There is no credit
given in academics to fidelity to previous ways of thinking. "68
These observations capture well the interdisciplinary explosion in
contemporary legal scholarship and the centrifugal force it has generated
in progressively exfoliating and departing from traditional doctrinal approaches. To that considerable extent the movement is a movement
away from something. But there is also a positive, "centripetal" moment, so to speak. In this departure and evasion, something is being affirmatively sought after: a source of scholarly authority outside law. Yet
this perceived need for intellectual authority is not new at all.

65. Bork Hearings, supra note 12, at 2440-41 (statement of George L. Priest); cf RICHARD
LEVIN, NEW READINGS VS. OLD PLAYS 196 (1979) (University teachers "know that their interpre-

tations are not likely to be published unless they say something.., that has never been said before,
which all too often means... that they must say something very strange.").
66. See W. JACKSON BATE, THE BURDEN OF THE PAST AND THE ENGLISH POET (1970).
67. See BLOOM, supra note 7; HAROLD BLOOM, A MAP OF MISREADING (1975). For further
discussion of this theme, see infra text accompanying notes 315-42.
68. Bork Hearings, supra note 12, at 2442 (statement of George L. Priest).
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"I begin with Nietzsche, perhaps (un)fashionably," writes the author of a recent article on Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to Tort.6 9 "No," I am tempted to reply, "you begin very
fashionably indeed."' 70 Admittedly, it might upon first glance seem
highly improbable that the work of an exotic, nineteenth-century German philosopher would provide telling glosses on the contemporary U.S.
Supreme Court's section 1983 adjudication. 7 1 (On second thought, it
seems even more implausible.)
Undeterred, the author proceeds to an elaborate discussion of the
work of Ferdinand de Saussure, 72 Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault. 73 Here in my exposition I was going to analyze how the author's
use of Nietzsche, Saussure, Derrida, and Foucault contributed to his discussion of section 1983 "discourse," but I could not find a single instance
in which their ideas were actually applied to the author's legal subject.
The closest he came were these: "[Derrida's] deconstruction of margins
helps us to understand the relative ease of the previously described shift
in emphasis from constitutional rhetoric to tort rhetoric in the Supreme
Court's § 1983 case law." 74 "As applied to the move from constitutional
rhetoric to tort rhetoric in the Supreme Court's § 1983 jurisprudence,
Foucault's approach suggests at the very least that an event of deep signif75
icance has occurred."
69. Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to Tort, 77 GEo.
L.J. 1719, 1731 (1989).
70. It has been suggested to me that the objects of my criticism are merely fads or fashions. My
response is that these are considered major or at least reputable scholarly works, published in the
leading law reviews. If these are fads or fashions, then they are fads or fashions of genuine intellectual significance for the sociology of knowledge.
There is a second, perhaps deeper, basis for my concern. These and other similar works exemplify what I see as an emerging postmodern thesis to the effect that fashionableness or modishness is
in itself a sufficient justification for legal scholarship. See David Kennedy, Spring Break, 63 TEx. L.
R v. 1377, 1423 (1985) ("[lIndeterminacy analysis might yield a situated anti-authoritarian practice, or might be simply the ultimate assertion of self: transforming the work of legal scholarship
into either strategy orfashion, constantly shifting its ground.") This thesis tends to erode the crucial
distinction between "intellectual authority" and "institutional authority." For further discussion of
these issues, see infra Part II.
71. The reference is to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), a post-Civil War civil rights statute that has
been the subject of a tremendous amount of litigation in recent years. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION §§ 8.1-.11 (1989).
72. See Nahmod, supra note 69, at 1733 ("Structural linguistics, as formulated by Ferdinand de
Saussure, provides valuable insights into the Supreme Court's § 1983 jurisprudence.").
73. See id. at 1734 ("Specifically relevant to my analysis of the Supreme Court's § 1983 jurisprudence are Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault.").
74. Id. at 1736.
75. Id. at 1738 (emphasis added). After the sections of the article on Nietzsche, Saussure,
Derrida, and Foucault, none of their ideas nor even any of their names is mentioned again-explicitly or implicitly-in the remainder of the article. The only possible exceptions to this are three
mentions of the words "margin" and "marginalize" (a term of Derrida's) at 1738, 1742, and 1750.
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What does it mean that wholly gratuitous discussions of Nietzsche,
Saussure, Derrida, and Foucault are now de rigueur in law review articles about section 1983, common law contract doctrine, 76 poverty law, 7 7
and even Uruguayan prisons? 78 I think it means that legal scholars are
desperately groping for an external, non-legal source of legitimacy or authority.79 The hope that this will be found in humanistic theory, however, is largely a vain one. These legal scholars' use of non-legal
(primarily humanistic) methods and, concepts is an attempt to bring

greater "intellectual authority" to a form of scholarship that, nevertheless, remains intractably dependent upon and derivative of the "institutional authority" of the judiciary.
At the same time that legal scholars increasingly seek a source of
intellectual authority outside of law, by a strange irony these same schol-

ars focus attention as never before onjudicialopinions as "original texts"
or "primary sources" of theory. As I shall explain below, 80 this focus on
"texts" reflects an essentially humanistic technique or method, but the
result is that adjudication remains the preferred theoretical model for
scholarship, and the legal opinion is increasingly elevated to sonihething it
never was even for the classical doctrinal scholars. In this sense, and
with a few notable exceptions,8 1 the widely advertised divergence between the work of the judge and that of the legal scholar has not in fact
76. See, eg., Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstructionof Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J.
997, 1007-10 (1985) (introducing, but then quickly dropping, a discussion of Derrida).
77. See, eg., Anthony Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice" LearningLessons of Client
Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2120 n.43 (1991) ("I attribute my analysis of power to Michel Foucault."); id, at 2120 n.46 ("Continental theory is represented here by Michel Foucault, Hans-Georg
Gadamer, Jurgen Habermas, Paul Ricoeur, and Roberto Unger. I also count Clifford Geertz and
Wayne Booth to be among this group.").
78. See Kennedy, supra note 70, at 1417-23; see also id. at 1422 (retracing the author's project
of "decentering my own textual presence" to "illustrate the process by which the analyzing subject
constructs itself out of ambiguity" and to "champion a practice of determinacy and indeterminacy
analysis in which one is always both challenging particular assertions of openness or closure and
maintaining an alternative position that asserts its openness and closure," and citing Derrida and
Rorty for further illumination); id at 1423 (posing but not answering questions like "Do we demystify a text or is the text always already seif-deconstructing? Are we the shock troops of anti-authoritarianism or the genteel revealers of the full complex texture of legal writing and the mechanisms of
its power of social persuasion?," and citing Foucault and De Man).
79. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 525 n.56 (1988) (criticizing the use of
phrases like "post-Wittgensteinian" as "attempting to lean on the argumentative props of associations with philosophers whose names are currently fashionable in legal circles"). But see Dennis
Patterson, Law's Pragmatism: Law as Practice& Narrative, 76 VA. L. REv. 937, 945 (1990) ("The
choice between the two readings of Wittgenstein has important implications for legal
jurisprudence.").
80. See infra notes 83-101 and accompanying text.
81. See, eg., Jeff Stmad, Taxation of Income From Capital. A Theoretical Reappraisal, 37
STAN. L. Rav. 1023 (1985) (85 page article on tax policy citing no cases); Roberto Unger, The
CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. Rlv. 561 (1983), a 112 page article-later published
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materialized. The prominent examples of contemporary legal scholarship examined in Part IV all markedly exhibit this tendency to apply
non-legal, humanistic methods and concepts to that quintessentially legal
primary source-the judicial opinion.
In effect, these new legal scholars want to "have it both ways."
They want to take a page out of the book of the poets and philosophers
and bring to the study of judicial opinions the transferred intellectual
authority and humanistic methods that are appropriate only in those
other disciplines. As I shall explain, this strongly misconstrues the very
different nature of scholarly authority in law and in the humanities.
In support of these conclusions I undertake in the following Part an
examination of the different bases of authority in law and the humanities.
Next, in Part III I explore the implications of these notions of authority
for the work of the judiciary. These findings are, finally, applied to some
prominent examples of contemporary legal scholarship.
II.

INTELLECTUAL AUTHORITY AND INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY

With force I have subdued the brains of the proud.
-Contemporary epigraph engraved on the
tomb of Cardinal Roberto Bellarmino,
82
consultant to the Roman Inquisition
A.

The Origins of Humanistic Methodology

In this Section, I elaborate an interpretation of humanistic methodology that emphasizes and draws upon two early stages in its historical
development: (1) the Renaissance rediscovery and appreciation of classical texts and traditional authors; and (2) the development, which reached
full fruition in the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, of a
decidedly skeptical attitude toward non-intellectual forms of authority.
As I shall show, these two features are related, yet they coexist only uneasily. Because some of the classical texts and authors would eventually
not stand up to modem scientific and intellectual scrutiny, in some instances their authority could be sustained only by reliance on non-intellectual forms of support.
as a book-pursuing, "[flor the sake ofspecificity," id. at 648 (emphasis added), extensive analyses of
"current American equal protection doctrine," id. at 609, and "contemporary Anglo-American contract law," id. at 621, without discussing or even mentioning a single case; see also Drucilla Cornell,
Institutionalizationof Meaning,Recollective Imaginationand the Potentialfor TransformativeLegal
Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1135 (1988) (95 page article, with 295 footnotes, citing three
cases); Michael Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for The Worse?, 41 STAN.

L. REv. 871 (1989) (87 page article, with 352 footnotes, citing four cases).
82. See PIETRO REDONDI, GALILEO: HERETIC 7 (1987).
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In the classical tradition of the humanities, authority derives principally from an original text or other primary source. 83 Etymologically,
the classical "authority" is the author (auctor, later auctour), the originator of something. 84 The history of humanistic learning resembles a perpetual "querelle des anciens et des modemes," 85 a "Great
Conversation" 86 across the ages. The source and subject of this dialogue
is the ancient learning embodied in classical texts.8 7 Understanding these
works, and comprehending their significance for modem times, are the
traditional goals of education in the humanities. 88
The humanist tradition also has a normative significance; these are
the issues, ideas, and thinkers we ought to be concerned with if we value
our humanity and our humanistic heritage. They command our intellectual respect, if not assent.89 "In a literary context, the term auctor de-

noted someone who was at once a writer and an authority, someone not
83. See Charles W. Collier, Precedent and Legal Authority: A CriticalHistory, 1988 Wis. L.
REv. 771, 805-09.

84. See 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 571-72 (1970); ALASTAIR J. MINNIS, MEDIEVAL
THEORY OF AUTHORSHIP 10-12 (1984) ("The Terms Auctor and Auctoritas"); E. D. WATr, AuTHORITY 11-17 (1982) ("Auctoritas and Authority").
85. See CARL BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS 134 (1951) (citing the main sources); HANS R. JAUSS, LITERATURGESCHICHTE ALS

PROVOKATION 11-66 (1974); Joseph Levine, Giambattista Vico and the QuarrelBetween the Ancients
and the Moderns, 52 J.HIST. IDEAS 55 (1991); cf.HUBERT GILLOT, LA QUERELLE DES ANCIENS
ET DES MODERNES EN FRANCE (1914); H. RIGAULT, Histoire de la Querelle des Anciens et des
Modernes, in I OEUVRES COMPLPTES DE H. RIGAULT (1859).
86. See generally ROBERT M. HUTCHINS, THE GREAT CONVERSATIONS: THE SUBSTANCE OF
A LIBERAL EDUCATION (1952) (volume one of the 54 volume Great Books of the Western World).
87. See id.:
The tradition of the West is embodied in the Great Conversation that began in the
dawn of history and that continues to the present day. Whatever the merits of other civilizations in other respects, no civilization is like that of the West in this respect. No other
civilization can claim that its defining characteristic is a dialogue of this sort. No dialogue
in any other civilization can compare with that of the West in the number of great works of
the mind that have contributed to this dialogue....
...[To the extent to which books can present the idea of a civilization, the idea of
Western civilization is here presented.
These books are the means of understanding our society and ourselves. They contain
the great ideas that dominate us without our knowing it. There is no comparable repository of our tradition.
Id. at 1-2.
88. See id, at 3-14; RENt WELLEK & AUSTIN WARREN, THEORY OF LITERATURE 3-45
(1949); Matthew Arnold, The Function of Criticism at the Present Time, in ESSAYS IN CRITICISM:
FIRST SERIES 8 (Thomas M. Hoctor ed., 1968).
89. As Edward Shils stated:
Tradition is ...far more than the statistically frequent recurrence over a succession of
generations of similar beliefs, practices, institutions, and works. The recurrence is a consequence of the normative consequences-sometimes the normative intention-of presentation and of the acceptance of the tradition as normative. It is this normative transmission
which links the generations of the dead with the generations of the living in the constitution of a society.
EDWARD.SHILS, TRADITION 24 (1981).
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merely to be read but also to be respected and believed." 90 The pro-

nouncements of primary authorities are not necessarily true, but they are
entitled to be considered "presumptively important." 9 1 The great classi-

cal thinkers provided "the great 'topics' of thought-the themes for discussion and the standard 'commonplaces' on these themes," as well as a
' 92
terminology "in the grooves of which thought could run."
In the European Middle Ages the development of commentaries and
glosses on primary sources became particularly marked when such great
thinkers as Averroes and Thomas Aquinas devoted the greater part of
their lives to the works of Aristotle. 93 The "rediscovery" of Aristotle's
works, some of which had lain in desuetude and others of which had
actually been lost for centuries, was the primary and precipitating cause
of the great revival of learning and scholarship in the European Middle
94
Ages.
The core subjects of what are now termed the "humanities"
originated in the humanistic studies of the Renaissance. 95 The aim of the
original humanists of the Renaissance was simply to get their contempo-

raries to read a few good books-the "primary sources" to which I

90. MINNIs, supra note 84, at 10 ("The writings of an auctorcontained, or possessed, auctoritas
in the abstract sense of the term, with its strong connotations of veracity and sagacity.... [A]s
Aristotle says, an auctoritasis a judgment of the wise man in his chosen discipline.").
91. See SHITS, supra note 89, at 24 ("Scientific and scholarly propositions, once they have been
enunciated, have [a] factually normative character. Representing the state of correct belief in, let us
say, mathematics or chemistry, their assertion both assumes their correctness and recommends their
acceptance. This is the barest normative minimum of any tradition of belief.").
92. 2 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA Aristotle 354 (1929) ("When thought had to be rebuilt
after the collapse of classical civilization, and while the middle ages were toiling at the work, it was
no small thing that men should have the tools of a terminology and the rules of accepted axioms.").
93. See ALLEN WHEELIS, THE END OF THE MODERN AGE 10 (1971).
94. See generally PIERRE MANDONNET, SIGER DE BRABANT ET L'AVERROYSME LATIN AU
XIIIME SItcLE (2d ed. 1911); ALEx PREMINGER ET AL., CLASSICAL AND MEDIEVAL LITERARY
CRITICISM 263-98, 341-48 (1974); RICHARD SHUTE, ON THE HISTORY OF THE PROCESS BY WHICH
THE ARISTOTELIAN WRITINGS ARRIVED AT THEIR PRESENT FORM (1888). See also WERNER
JAEGER, ARISTOTLE: FUNDAMENTALS OF THE HISTORY OF HIS DEVELOPMENT (Richard Robin-

son trans., 1934).
On the medieval "rediscovery" of Aristotle, see DAVID KNOWLES, THE EVOLUTION OF MEDIEVAL THOUGHT 185-92 (1962); Paul 0. Kristeller, PhilosophicalMovements of the Renaissance, in
STUDIES IN RENAISSANCE THOUGHT AND LETTERS 17 (1956).
95. See ERNST CASSIRER ET AL., THE RENAISSANCE PHILOSOPHY OF MAN 4 (1948).

Vol. 41:191]

HUMANISTIC THEORY IN LAW

209

referred. 96 Unlike the Scholastics, "they exercised their scholarship only
97
to [provide] reliable texts" of the classical authors.
But the development of Renaissance text criticism, of philology, had
deeper implications, which came "in the most unlikely way from the
study of Latin and Greek, which stimulated in literary scholars a feeling
for exactness as passionate as the new-found Greek mathematics stimulated in scientists. As a result, they learned to analyse the grammar, the
locutions, and the references in old texts precisely enough to challenge
the traditional dates that had been accepted for these texts."'9 8 This development was of more than historical interest: It was revolutionary because it inaugurated in Renaissance scholarship the standard of tested
truth and a corresponding new understanding of the relationship to "authority." 99 Eventually, then, even the humanists-those least inclined to
scientific experimentation and most enamored of the classical book-learning-adopted a more skeptical and considered view of their primary
sources.
This new relationship to authority is what I shall refer to as "intellectual authority." It may be defined as "the authority exerted by arguments that make their way simply by virtue of a superior rationality and
do not depend for their impact on the lines of power and influence operating in an institution."00 Intellectual authority has withstood "the test
of time," in the sense of withstanding intellectual scrutiny in the free

96. See Jacob Bronowski, Copernicus as a Humanist,in THE NATuRE OF SCIENTIFIC DiscovERY at 179 (Owen Gingerich ed., 1975) ("Humanism in any sense is by origin an academic movement, because the sources at which it seeks its new knowledge are classical texts."); see also
Kristeller, supra note 94, at 24 ("mhe core and center of Renaissance humanism [is] the emphasis
on the Greek and Latin classics as the chief subjects of study and as unrivaled models of imitation, in
writing and in thinking and even in actual conduct."); CASSIRER, supra note 95, at 3-4 ("The major
concern of the Humanists was an educational and cultural program based on the study of the classical Greek and Latin authors.").
97. Michael Shenefelt, DisposableScholarship, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1989, at A21.
98. Bronowski, supra note 96, at 183-84.
99. See id at 184; ROBERTO WEISS, THE RENAISSANCE DISCOVERY OF CLASSICAL ANTIQuiTY (2d ed. 1988); cf. Kristeller, supra note 94:
Mhe so-called philosophers of nature... emphasized the direct study of nature and their
own originality .... This claim of originality ... undermined the accepted authority of
Aristotle, opened the way for new alternatives and presupposed the notion, more or less
explicitly, that human knowledge could make definite progress beyond the attainments of
the ancients.
Id. at 28.
100. Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1325, 1342 (1984) (summarizing Fiss and
Toulmin). In some sense this is not "authority" at all. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 571 (1987).
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marketplace of debate and in the history of ideas. In other words, intel-

lectual authority is based not on power, but on conviction; not on rhetoric, but on rational persuasion. 01 (The contrastive notion of
"institutional authority," which arises when these conditions are not
present, will be elaborated in the following Section.)
"In the Renaissance, as always, men turned to the careful observa-

10 2
tion of nature only after every other idea and authority had failed."

But fail they did. Even among the classical humanist scholars of the

Renaissance, it eventually became clear that the authority of many received, medieval, Aristotelian views extended far beyond what could be
justified on purely intellectual grounds. For example, one of the Aristotelian treatises states that men have more teeth than women, and this was

long believed, on Aristotle's authority alone, to be true.10 3 Finally, someone checked, and it turned out to be false. Similarly, Aristotle taught
that a needle cannot float on water, which is also untrue and would have
been easy to check.' 4 (I have performed the experimdnt myself.) The
Scholastics maintained that Aristotle must have had in mind a large,
heavy needle, or intended it to be placed erect in the water; Galileo, however, had the temerity to claim that Aristotle must never have performed
05
the experiment.'
In the scientific thought of the Renaissance, of course, a main thrust
was the revolt against and rejection of Aristotle's authority.106 But per-

haps what we see most clearly here is the evolution of Aristotle's intellectual authority into a form of "institutional" authority, and it is this that
explains the durability of his thought even into the scientific revolution of
07
the seventeenth century.'
101. See Peter Munz, The Rhetoric of Rhetoric, 51 J. HIST. IDEAS 121, 121-22 (1990).
102. JOHN H. RANDALL, JR., THE MAKING OF THE MODERN MIND 218 (1976) ("What the

revival of ancient learning did for science was to bring a wealth of conflicting suggestions into men's
ken, and force them to appeal to reason to decide ....With so many newly-found doctrines in the
field, bitterly fighting each other, . . . one outcome of the whole period was the growth of
skepticism.").
103. See AmSTOTLE,Problems, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1519 (963b20)
(Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984). This work was probably written not by Aristotle himself but by one or
more of his later disciples. See Note to the Reader, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE,
supra, at xiii. Nevertheless, it was accepted as canonical Aristotelianism throughout the periods in
question here.
104. See ARISroTLE, On the Heavens, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 465 (313a18)
(Richard McKeon ed., 1941).
105. See WILLIAM R. SHEA, GALILEO'S INTELLECTUAL REVOLUTION 33 (1972).
106. See, eg., ALEXANDRE KoYitt, FROM THE CLOSED WORLD TO THE INFINITE UNIVERSE
(1957); Kristeller, supra note 94, at 28-30.
107. See, eg., ALEXANDRE KOYRit, GALILEO STUDIES (1978):
[The scientific revolution of the seventeenth century] seems to have been the outcome of a
decisive mutation. It is this which explains why the discovery of things which seem to us
nowadays childishly simple required such prolonged efforts--and not always crowned with
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Probably the most momentous conflict between intellectual authority and institutional authority ever recorded is that between Galileo
Galilei and medieval Aristotelianism. But the picture is complicated, because Galileo may be regarded as struggling on two distinct fronts-one
scientific and one religious-against both medieval Aristotelianism and
its institutional patron, the Catholic Church.10 8 As Milton commented
after visiting Galileo in Florence, "There it was that I found and visited
the famous Galileo grown old, a prisoner to the Inquisition, for thinking
in astronomy
otherwise than the Franciscan and Dominican licensers
' ' to9
thought.

Since the thirteenth century, Aristotelianism had been the model for
science in European universities, partially because Aristotle's views were
(or could be made) generally congenial to Church doctrine. 110 For example, when a huge meteorite fell to earth at Aegospotami, Aristotle explained that "it had been carried up by a wind and fell down." ' The
heavens (which were supposed to be light, luminous, spherical, perfect,
and eternal 1 2) were thus spared the indignity of having harbored a
heavy, ugly, odd-shaped, dirty rock-especially one that could accidentally come crashing down to earth.
By contrast, Galileo's Copernican, heliocentric views constituted an
outright affront to the authority of Scripture. If the sun stood still, for
example, the biblical story that God caused the sun to stand still at
Joshua's request would be nonsensical." 3 But Galileo remained stubbornly unwilling or unable to recognize or acknowledge that he was entangled in an essentially political, religious, dogmatic, institutional
success-by the greatest of geniuses, by Galileo and Descartes. This is because it was not a
matter of battling against theories which were simply inadequate or erroneous, but of
changing the very intellectual framework itself, of overthrowing an intellectual attitude,
one which was when all is said and done a perfectly natural one, and substituting for it
another, one which was not natural at all.
Id. at 3 (footnote omitted).
108. For documentary histories, see MAURICE A. FiNOCCHIARO, THE GALILEO AFFAIR: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1989); EMILE NAMER, L'AFFAIRE GALILtE (1975). For a brief but fascinating account, see Owen Gingerich, The Galileo Affair, SCIENTIFIC AM., Aug. 1982, at 132.
109. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 27 (K.M. Lea ed., 1973).

110. See CHARLES SCHMIT', THE ARISTOTELIAN TRADITION AND RENAISSANCE UNIVERSITIES 303-06 (1984); Aristotle in the MiddleAges, in 1 DICTIONARY OF THE MIDDLE AGES 456, 46163 (Joseph Strayer ed., 1982).
111. Aristotle, Meteorology, in I THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 103, at 563
(344b32); cf G.S. KIRK & J.E. RAVEN, THE PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS: A CRITICAL HISTORY
wrrH A SELECTION OF TEXTS 392 (1957) (discussing the meteorite and Anaxagoras's more "rational" belief that the heavenly bodies were made of stone); JOHN BURNET, EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY 252 (4th ed. 1957) (discussing the meteorite and Aristotle's explanation for its appearance).
112. See C.S. LEwis, THE DISCARDED IMAGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE LITERATURE 92-121 (1967); EUSTACE M.W. TILLYARD, THE ELIZABETHAN WORLD

PICTURE 34-36 (1944).
113. See Joshua 10:12-13.
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thicket as well as a rational, logical, scientific, intellectual debate. Characteristic is his response to the charge of having undermined the Joshua
passage. He offered, in all earnestness, an elaborate scientific proof that
the Joshua story was self-contradictory and unintelligible, "regardless of
the world system one assumes." 114 Of course, Galileo had never heard
of, much less read, the works of Thomas Kuhn, Richard Rorty, or even
Stanley Fish, which perhaps explains his naive insistence on defending
the Copernican system as physically real and actually true-and not
merely as a simpler "working hypothesis" that yielded more precise re1 15
suits and agreed better with the observations.
Galileo's struggle with medieval Aristotelianism provides a key contrast between the scholarly, intellectual relationship to authority and
what I shall discuss later as the different and specifically legal relationship to it.116 In a letter to the lawyer Francesco Ingoli, Galileo clearly
stated the difference:
I must tell you that in natural phenomena human authority is worthless. Like a lawyer, you seem to capitalize on it; but nature, Dear Sir,
makes fun of constitutions and decrees of princes, emperors, and
monarchs, and at their request it would not change one iota of its laws
and statutes. Aristotle was a man, saw with his eyes, heard with his
ears, and reasoned with his brain. I am a man and see with my eyes
much more than he did; as regards reasoning, I believe he reasoned
about more things than I, but whether he reasoned better than I about
those things which we have both examined
will be shown by our argu11 7
ments and not by our authorities.
As Galileo's favorite disciple Benedetto Castelli described him, "the
truth . .. he fittingly places above everything else, just as, in natural
questions, he puts nature above the authority of any famous author, as
any one who wishes to philosophise properly ought to do."' 18 Similarly,
114. FINOCCHIARO, supra note 108, at 110 (quoting letter from Galileo to the Grand Duchess

Christina (1615)); see also id at 52-54 (discussing letter from Galileo to Castelli (Dec. 21, 1613)); cf
id. at 114-18 (examining to what extent Joshua passage can be taken without altering literal meaning

of words).
115. See RIcHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 329 (1979) (Galileo
might have avoided difficulties by presenting his conception as "really just an ingenious heuristic
device for, say, navigational purposes and other sorts of practically oriented celestial reckoning.. "); see also id. at 327-33 (analyzing the difficulties Galileo faced in creating purely scientific
questions).
116. See infra text accompanying notes 149-64.
117. FINOCCHIARO, supra note 108, at 178 (quoting letter from Galileo to Ingoli (1624)).
118. WILLIAM R. SHEA, GALILEO'S INTELLECTUAL REVOLUTION 34 (1972) (quoting BENEDETrO CASTELLI, RISPOSTA ALLE OPPOSIZIONI (1615)). Consider Shea's further observations:
What strikes (and usually annoys) the modem reader of sixteenth- and seventeenthcentury scientific literature is the constant appeal to the writings of great men of the past.
Where a modem scientist introduces experimental evidence to prove a point, a medieval or
a Renaissance scholar will quote a relevant passage from one of the Greek
philosophers....
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in a letter to the Grand Duchess Christina, Galileo wrote: "I think that
in disputes about natural phenomena one must begin not with the authority of scriptural passages but with sensory experience and necessary
demonstrations." 19
Although Galileo has often been described as "the father of modem
science," he is also at one with the humanists in his understanding of the
intellectual's uneasy relationship to institutional authority. In a Foreword to the Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World SystemsGalileo's main work and the work for which he was mainly condemned-Albert Einstein writes:
The leitmotif which I recognize in Galileo's work is the passionate
fight against any kind of dogma based on authority. Only experience
and careful reflection are accepted by him as criteria of truth. Nowadays it is hard for us to grasp how sinister and revolutionary such an
attitude appeared at Galileo's time, when merely to doubt the truth of
opinions which had no basis but authority was considered a capital
crime and punished accordingly. Actually we are by no means so far
removed from such a situation even today as many of us would like to
flatter ourselves; but in theory, at least, the principle of unbiased
out, and most people are willing to pay lip service to
thought has won
1 20
this principle.
Likewise, "[t]he humanist... rejects authority," in the sense of institutional authority. "But he respects tradition," which is another word for
what I have termed intellectual authority. "Not only does he respect it,
he looks upon it as upon something real and objective which has to be
This attitude of mind irritated Galileo for whom the interpreter of nature was neither
Aristotle, nor Plato, nor Democritus, nor any of the Ancients but nature speaking for itself.
While the Aristotelians sought to solve a problem, as though it were a legal question, by
appealing to authority, Galileo went directly to the tribunal of nature-albeit with Archimedes as his barrister.
Id. at 31, 33 (emphasis added). Lest one assume, however, that we now have a regime of pure
intellectual authority in science, see Gina Kolata, To Make the Big Time of Science, Better Take
Your Show on the Road, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1990, at Cl.
119. FINOCCHIARO, supra note 108, at 93 (quoting'letter from Galileo to the Grand Duchess
Christina (1615)). These sentiments brought Galileo into direct conflict with the Roman Catholic
authorities, and he was eventually put on trial by the Roman Inquisition on charges of heresy. In
1633, Galileo was convicted and sentenced as follows:
We say, pronounce, sentence, and declare that you, the above-mentioned Galileo, because of the things deduced in the trial and confessed by you as above, have rendered
yourself according to this Holy Office vehemently suspected of heresy, namely of having
held and believed a doctrine which is false and contrary to the divine and Holy Scripture:
that the sun is the center of the world and does not move from east to west, and the earth
moves and is not the center of the world, and that one may hold and defend as probable an
opinion after it has been declared and defined contrary to Holy Scripture. Consequently
you have incurred all the censures and penalties imposed and promulgated by the sacred
canons and all particular and general laws against such delinquents.
Id. at 291 (quoting Sentence of June 22, 1633).
120. Albert Einstein, Foreword to GALILEO, DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE Two CHIEF WORLD
SYsmMs at xvii (Stillman Drake trans., 1962).
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studied and, if necessary reinstated." 12 1 The humanist may be obsessed
with a few primary, original sources, but these are "authorities" that
have earned their authority.
This perspective allows one to make some distinctions that were previously unavailable. We may safely discard the bulk of Aristotle's cosmology, for example, as a quaint relic that did not pass "the test of time,"
while still appreciating the importance and relevance of his ethical and
political writings. 12 2 In fact, even today, and even among legal scholars,
23
those latter works retain considerable currency.
In summary, the distinction between primary sources and secondary
sources is basic to scholarly work in the humanities. 124 That which is
authoritative is original, unique, and complete unto itself; all else is secondary and derivative. Thus, in a "normal" humanistic discipline, scholarly authority resides in "primary" or original sources, which typically
are few and far between. These primary sources have earned what I term
"intellectual authority." In philosophy, for example, the works of Plato,
Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, Kant, and Hegel are generally acknowledged to be primary sources. 125 They have earned their authority because, over the course of centuries, they have provided enduring
121. Erwin Panofsky, The History of Art as a HumanisticDiscipline, in MEANING IN THE VISUAL ARTS: PAPERS IN AND ON ART HISTORY 3-4 (1955).

122. See, ag., HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 7-78 (1958).
123. See, eg., Donald F. Brosnan, Virtue Ethics in a PerfectionistTheory of Law andJustice, 1
CARDOZO L. REv. 335 (1989) (analyzing Aristotle's virtue-based theory of ethics); Linda Hirshman,
The Virtue of Liberality in American Communal Life, 88 MICH. L. REv. 983, 996-1001 (1990) (discussing "[tihe current fashion for Aristotle"); Anthony T. Kronnan, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI.
L. REv. 835 (1987) (discussing Aristotelian philosophy in legal ethics); Lawrence B. Solum, The
Virtue and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian Guide to JudicialSelection, 61 S.CAL. L. REv. 1735
(1988). But see Schauer, supra note 100, at 847 ("Unfashionably, I start with Aristotle.").
124. See, eg., HUTCHINS, supra note 86, at xxiv (discussing the "cult of scholarship surrounding" Dante's Divine Comedy, and telling the "ordinary reader" that he will be "surprised to find that
he understands Dante without it").
The slogan "Back to Kanti" summarizes an intellectual movement in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries that illustrates the humanistic preoccupation with original texts and primary
sources. See Lewis W. Beck, Neo-Kantianism, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 468, 468
(1967).
125. So too are, arguably, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre. The jury is
still out on Barthes, Derrida, Foucault, and Lacan. Richard Rorty is (perhaps even as a necessary
implication of his own views) a secondary source. See, eg., RORTY, supra note 115:
This book is a survey of some recent developments in philosophy, especially analytic philosophy ....Thus the reader in search of a new theory on any of the subjects discussed
will be disappointed.... The therapy offered is ...parasitic upon the constructive efforts
of the very analytic philosophers whose frame of reference I am trying to put in question.
Thus most of the particular criticisms of the tradition which I offer are borrowed from
such systematic philosophers as Sellars, Quine, Davidson, Ryle, Malcolm, Kuhn, and
Putnam.
I am as much indebted to these philosophers for the means I employ as I am to
Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey for the ends to which these means are put.
Id. at 7.
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responses to what have proved to be enduring concerns. In this sense,
"survival is the test of greatness," 1 26 where "survival" is understood as
withstanding the test of extended intellectual debate and discussion.
Much (if not most) of the "secondary" work in philosophy consists in'
explicating, analyzing, and criticizing these primary sources and in developing their implications. 127
The process of earning intellectual authority is thus a historicalprocess, and "intellectual authority" is an inherently historical concept.

True intellectual authority appeals to disinterested reason and objective
observers, over widely separated historical periods.
B. InstitutionalAuthority in Law
What are the "primary sources" of law? Since the late nineteenth
century, at least in the Anglo-American legal world, the answer has been

judicial opinions. 128 A brief contrast with the civil law tradition is
instructive.
In the civil law tradition, the scholar is the legal actor most responsible for the development and refinement of the law. In Germany, for ex-

ample, one would cite as "primary sources" of legal thought such classic
legal scholars as Savigny, Puchta, Windscheid, Jhering, Gierke, Heck,
Kelsen, and Radbruch. In the civil law tradition generally,
the legal scholar is the great man of the civil law. Legislators, executives, administrators, judges, and lawyers all come under his influence.
He molds the civil law tradition and the formal materials of the law
126. Posner, supra note 9, at 1356 (pondering whether survival is the test of greatness).
127. It is sometimes maintained that "analytic" philosophy does not fit this mold because it is
modeled on natural science and has no interest in its own history. See, eg., THOMAS S.KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFC REVOLUTIONS 137-39, 165 (2d ed. 1970). I doubt, though, that analytic
philosophy ever succeeded in being, or even seriously tried to be, rigorously ahistorical. As noted
above, Wittgenstein has clearly been elevated to the pantheon of primary sources, such that his every
pronouncement-however offhand or obscure-has become canonical. See supra note 125. A similar process can already be observed in the treatment of a few contemporary analytic philosophers.
See, eg., DAVID ARMSTRONG, THE NATURE OF MIND 85 (1981); JOHN BISHOP, NATURAL
AGENCY 132-34 (1989); MYLES BRAND, INTENDING AND ACTING: TOWARD A NATURALIZED
ACTION THEORY 18, 31, 35 (1984); CARLOS MOYA, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION 118-25 (1990);
JOHN R. SEARLE, INTENTIONALrrY: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 83, 108-09 (1990);
RAIMO TUOMELA, HUMAN ACTION AND ITS EXPLANATION 257-58 (1977); Jon Elster, The Nature
andScope of Rational-ChoiceExplanation, in ACTIONS AND EVENTS: PERSPECTIVES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF DONALD DAVIDSON 60, 61-62 (Ernest LePore & Brian McLaughlin eds., 1985) [hereinafter ACTIONS AND EVENTS]; Dagfinn Follesdal, Causation and Explanation, in ACTIONS AND
EVENTS, supra, at 311, 322; George Wilson, Davidson on Intentional Action, in ACTIONS AND
EVENTS, supra, at 29, 38-40 (all analyzing the same passage in Davidson). As Davidson himself has
said, "[a~nalytic philosophy is not, of course, either a method or a doctrine; it is a tradition and an
attitude." Donald Davidson, Preface to ACTIONS AND EVENTS, supra, at xi. See generally LUCIEN
BRAUN, HISTOIRE DE L'HISTOIRE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE (1973); RORTY, supra note 115.
128. See Collier, supra note 83, at 809-11.
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into a model of the legal system. He teaches this model to law students
and writes about it in books and articles. Legislators and judges accept
his idea of what law is, and, when they make or apply law, they use
concepts he has developed. Thus although legal scholarship is not a
formal source of law, the doctrine carries immense authority. 129
In other words, the ideas of the Continental legal scholar carry weight
because of their inherent intellectual authority-the judges are free to
accept and adopt or reject and ignore them.
By contrast, in the common law tradition the legal actor most influential in shaping the growth and development of law is thejudge.130 In a
real but obviously very problematic sense, "the law is what the judges say
it is." Judicial opinions-rather than legal scholarship, constitutions,
statutes, regulations, or other forms of positive or enacted law-have assumed the status of original texts and "primary sources" of law.13 1 Historically, this view of law has three main sources.
One such source is William Blackstone. After explaining that "the
authority of... [the common law] rests entirely upon general reception
and usage," 132 and that the only method of proving a maxim to be a rule
of the common law "is by showing that it hath been always the custom to
observe it,'133 he notes that a basic question still remains: "[H]ow are
these customs or maxims to be known, and by whom is their validity to
be determined?" 134 To Blackstone, the answer is obvious: "by the judges
in the several courts of justice": 135
They are the depositories of the laws; the living oracles, who must decide in all cases of doubt, and who are bound by an oath to decide
according to the law of the land. The knowledge of that law is derived
from experience and study.., and from being long personally accustomed to the judicial decisions of their predecessors. And indeed these
judicialdecisions are the principaland most authoritativeevidence, that
129. JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL
SYSTEM OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 56, 60 (2d ed. 1985).

130. See id. at 60; see also John H. Merryman, The Italian Style, 18 STAN. L. REV. 39, 396, 583
(1965-66).
131. See Collier, supra note 83, at 813-16; cf James B. White, The Judicial Opinion and the
Poem Ways ofReading, Ways of Life, in HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 108 (1985):

In my own experience at least, the same central method was at work in both legal and
literary education, for both to a remarkable degree proceeded by drawing the student's
attention to a series of discrete texts, one after another, and holding it there. In law the
text was typically the judicial opinion; in literary studies usually, though not always, the
poem. In both fields the emphasis was on the text as a self-justifying, self-explaining, selfauthenticating object.
Id
132. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68 (1765).

133. Id.
134. Id at 69.
135. Id.
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can be given, of the existence ofsuch a custom as shallform apartof the
136
common law.

A second principal source of "law as what the judges say it is" may
be found in the Marbury-Cooperdoctrine of judicial review and judicial
supremacy. In Marbury v. Madison,137 Chief Justice Marshall argued for
the power of judicial review on the basis of institutional competence and
notions of the judicial role: "It is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule
138
to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule."'
If a law and the Constitution both apply to a particular case, says Marshall, "the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs
the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty." 13 9 In Cooper v.
Aaron, 14° a unanimous Court carried this thought further and saw
therein the seeds of judicial "supremacy"; quoting the above language
from Marbury, the Cooper Court stated that the Marbury decision:
declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the
exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever
since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent
and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that
by this
the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated
14 1
Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land.

The judicial gloss on the constitutional text has, it would seem, supplanted the authority of that text itself.' 42

Finally, Christopher Columbus Langdell contributed a seminal conceptualization of law as case law. Langdell combined the "scientific"
136. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
137. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
138. Id. at 177.
139. Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
140. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
141. Id. at 18 (emphasis added). Justice Frankfurter, writing separately in Cooper, maintained
that "[o]ur kind of society cannot endure if the controlling authority of the Law as derived from the
Constitution is not to be the tribunal specially charged with the duty of ascertaining and declaring
what is 'the supreme Law of the Land."' Id at 24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting U.S.
CONsT. art. VI, § 2).
142. See JOHN BRIGHAM, THE CULT OF THE COURT (1987):
The authority of the institution over the Constitution comes from the practice of judicial
review. We have come to speak of the Constitution as "what the justices say it is" and we
look for "it" in their opinions. Their words are no longer authoritative gloss on the thing
itself; they have become the thing itself.
Id. at 31. For suggestions that the Cooper doctrine still approximates current judicial practice, see
NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 340, 481 U.S. 573, 597-98 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("[Tihe Court, having already sanctioned a point of departure that is genuinely not to be
found within the language of the statute, finds itself cut off from that authoritative source of the law,
and ends up construing not the statute but its own construction.").
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project of observing and classifying actual specimens, with the humanis-

tic focus on original texts and primary sources. 143 For Langdell it is selfevident that law is "embodied" in cases:
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines.... Each of these doctrines has arrived at its present state by
slow degrees; in other words, it is a growth, extending in many cases
through centuries. This growth is to be traced in the main through a
series of cases; and much the shortest and best, if not the only way of
mastering the doctrine effectually is by studying the cases in which it is
embodied ....

144

Langdell freely indulges the humanist's assumption that knowledge is derived chiefly through the careful study and analysis of original texts and
primary sources; the "printed books" of reported cases are, he says, "the
ultimate sources of all legal knowledge."14 5 The textbooks, treatises, and
"hornbooks" that had mainly been relied on up to Langdell's time are

decidedly not "ultimate sources" for him or his followers. 146 In fact,
"the student should.., be distinctly discouraged from regarding as law,

what is, in fact, simply the conclusions of writers whose opinions are
based upon the material to which the student can be given access."' 4 7 It
follows, on Langdellian principles, that "the opinion of the court giving
the reasons for the conclusion reached, is really the only authoritative
148
treatise which we have in our law."
143. See Collier, supra note 83, at 809-11.
144. CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS at v
(1871).
145. Langdell, supra note 45, at 85. Langdell states further: "Accordingly, the Law Library has
been the object of our greatest and most constant solicitude." It is to the lawyer "all that the laboratories of the university are to the chemists and physicists, all that the museum of natural history is to
the zodlogists, all that the botanical garden is to the botanists." Id. at 86-87. Langdell adds further
that "a good academic training, especially in the study of language,is a necessary qualification for the
successful study of law." Id at 87 (emphasis added); see also Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature:
Do Legal Texts have AuthoritativeInterpretations?,in THE AUTHORITY OF EXPERTS 242 (Thomas
L. Haskell ed., 1984):
To an extent never sufficiently acknowledged by his many detractors, Langdell was
altogether correct in linking the legitimacy of the law to the mastery of texts, whether of
cases, statutes, or the Constitution. However much legal positivism justifiably emphasizes
the origins of law in social facts, the ordinary language of all developed legal systems includes constant recourse to texts that authorize specific conduct. One does not have to
accept the entire Langdellian system (indeed, I most certainly do not) in order to recognize
the centrality of textuality to the lawyer's enterprise.
Id. at 242-43 (footnotes omitted).
146. See EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES 73, 81 (2d ed. 1894).
147. Keener, supra note 46, at 144.
148. Id. at 145; see also GILMORE, supra note 10, at 42-43 (describing Langdel's belief that legal
truth is a species of scientific truth, and that once a true rule of law is discovered, it will endure
forever); JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN UNIVER-

srrY LAW SCHOOLS 37 (1914) ("The whole law lies in the reports of single cases which have been
accumulating for centuries."); White, supra note 43, at 220-32 (discussing Langdell's belief in the
primary importance of judicial opinions in legal education).
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To summarize, there is a long and complicated tradition (in the
common law world at least) to the effect that judicial opinions are to the
lawyer what original texts and primary sources are to the humanist.
They are the lawyer's "source of authority." But here some crucial differences must be noted. How did the authors of those opinions get in a
position to write the authoritative texts of the law? Granting, for purposes of argument, that these texts are indeed "authoritative," what
makes them so? I suggest that we can see here a crucial difference with
the humanistic tradition.
Consider the very different "citation practices" in law and the humanities. In law, one can simply cite a case as authority for a proposition, or indeed for a legal conclusion or as the basis for a judicial
decision. The mere fact that a case has been decided one way rather than
another, or that a judge has made a particular pronouncement, provides
grounds ("authority") for deciding another case similarly or in conformity with the judge's pronouncement-whatever it may be. In law, saying
something "with authority" means, literally, saying it "with authorities." 149 In this sense, as Leonardo da Vinci observed, "'[w]hoever...
appeals to authority applies not his intellect but his memory.' "150 But
what would it mean to cite Plato as authority for a proposition in philosophy? In other words, the fact that Plato said something does not settle
the issue in philosophy the way it would in law. At most, the reader is
simply referred to Plato for an interesting or relevant treatment of a
point under consideration; it always remains to be seen whether Plato's
discussion of the issue will be found persuasive or even helpful.
Judicial opinions are authoritative, not because of their inherent intellectual content, but rather because of the social or "institutional" position of their authors. Judicial opinions are authoritative because they are
written by people who are already in a position of authority. More specifically, these people are in a position to enforce their decrees through

149. See Collier, supra note 83, at 811-12; see also Anthony T. Kromnan, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990); David Luban, Legal Traditionalism,43 STAN. L. REv. 1035 (1991);
Schauer, supra note 100. For a comparison with "the overwhelmingly bookish or clerkly character"
of medieval culture, see LEwis, supra note 112, at 5, 11.
The legal concept of authority also bears comparison with the medieval art of dialectic, which
taught that there are three kinds of proof: from reason; from authority; and from experience. "We
establish a geometrical truth by Reason; a historical truth, by Authority, by auctours. We learn by
experience that oysters do not agree with us." Id. at 189.
150. W. T. SEDGWICK & H. W. TYLER, A SHORT HISTORY OF SCIENCE 235 (1917) (quoting

unpublished work of Leonardo da Vinci).

220
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socially sanctioned physical force, should the persuasive force of reasoned argument and intellectual conviction be insufficient. 15 1

Thus, the authors of judicial opinions have only the authority of an
office, to which they have been appointed (or, in some states, elected). In

"normal" humanistic disciplines, primary sources emerge through a process of intellectual recognition; in law the "primary sources" have, in
effect, been appointed. They have not earned their authority, at least not
in the sense that Plato and Aristotle have, by garnering support through

centuries of reasoned debate and intellectual assessment. They command
our obedience, but not necessarily our intellectual respect.' 52 As Justice
Robert H. Jackson once remarked of the U.S. Supreme Court, "We are

not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we
are final." 153 Justice Jackson further stated that if there were a court
above the Supreme Court, a "substantial portion" of the Supreme

Court's decisions would be reversed. 154 In the terminology of modem
social science, "legitimacy refers to the capacity of an institution to con-

fine political behavior to 'institutionally relevant choices' ....

In prac-

tice, the Court's place in the process has become the key to its authority.

With the Supreme Court, a loss is the end of the line."' 55

Justice Jackson's protestations notwithstanding, Alexander Bickel
observes that "there is a tendency nonetheless to believe that everyone

else is more fallible than the justices."' 56 Bickel contends that "this is
only sentiment-understandable and gratifying to those who cherish the
151. For further discussion of these issues, see JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM
(1986); Frederick Schauer, The Authority of Legal Scholarship, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (1991);
Symposium: The Works of Joseph Raz, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 731 (1989).
152. See Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudenceof Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827 (1988):
Judicial authority is essentially political: Decisions are authoritative because they emanate
from a politically authorized source rather than because they are agreed to be correct by
persons in whom the community reposes an absolute epistemic trust. The political connotations of the word "authoritative" are apt; the word evokes power and submission, not
truth and conviction.
Id. at 842-43; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 79-98 & n.35
(1990).
153. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
154. See id ("[Rleversal by a higher court is not proof that justice is thereby better done.").
155. BRIGHAM, supra note 142, at 31 (citation omitted); cf. Robert Grafstein, The Legitimacy of
PoliticalInstitutions, 14 POLITY 51 (1981):
In the purest sense, a legitimate institution secures obedience to its decisions by the
very fact of having made them through appropriate institutional procedures. Its outcomes
are accepted, in the behavioral sense, when they are generated through the decision-making
process of the institution. The process might be a highly ritualized procedure used by a
jungle tribe, or it might be a vote taken by the nine members of the United States Supreme
Court.
Id. at 58.

156.

ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT: AND WHAT,

IF

ANY-

THING, To Do ABOUT IT 13 (1973); see also Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 37 (1934).
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institution, but sentiment nevertheless-not any sort of decisive consideration." 157 Certainly, the development of a "cult of the Court" is a well
documented phenomenon, one whose provenance and explanation probably lie more in the realm of psychology than in law. 158 But-cults
aside-there is no real, intellectually defensible reason to suppose that
the Justices merit serious consideration as intellectual titans alongside
Plato and Aristotle, Kant and Hegel. The fact that they have what I
shall term "institutional authority" simply obscures the fact that they do
not have "intellectual authority." To my mind, these simple institutional
facts make inherently implausible any attempts to attribute grand, philosophical doctrines to the judiciary-which is precisely what those I criticize do.
But I do not rest my case on the theoretical level alone. As an empirical matter it is not difficult to show that most pronouncements of the
judiciary owe their authority solely to their status in the institutional
scheme. The ideas and opinions of most Supreme Court Justices would
not be of the slightest general interest or importance, except for the fact
(which must be considered fortuitous from an intellectual point of view)
that they are the ideas and opinions of Supreme Court Justices. Certainly, they would not otherwise be assumed to be of theoretical or philosophical significance. The presence on the judiciary of an occasional
John Marshall, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis, or Benjamin
Cardozo in no way weakens this argument; they are decidedly the exceptions to the rule that most judges, even Supreme Court Justices, have
been plucked from well deserved intellectual obscurity.1 59 Yet, because
most of the "secondary" scholarly work in law consists in explicating,
analyzing, and criticizing judicial opinions, these opinions and their authors have, by default, assumed the status of primary sources and, by
extension, suitable subjects for philosophical theorizing.
I do not argue that judicial opinions lack intellectual merit because
judges are not philosophers or experts in philosophical theory. There
are, of course, many kinds of intellectual merit or expertise other than
157. BICKEL, supra note 156, at 14.
158. See THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1969); JEROME FRANK,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE
L.J. 1290 (1937).
159. See BRIGHAM, supra note 142, at 78-79 ("The rare case in which the vision of a judge...
overwhelm[s] nearly all political considerations tells us about factors that are otherwise muted ....
The Cardozo appointment is the exception that proves the rule and demonstrates the vision that
lurks in the background-the vision of a wise man ....). In the context of Hoover's nomination of
Cardozo, Paul Freund has suggested that a surpassingly strong Supreme Court nomination may be
understood simply as the attempt of a weak President to shore up his position. See Paul Freund,
Appointment of Justices: Some HistoricalPerspectives, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1155 (1988).
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the philosophical, and judges are, presumably, selected on some such basis. Rather, I argue that there is no reason to assume, from the obvious
institutional authority of judges, that they also possess intellectual authority or produce primary sources comparable to those in other
disciplines.
An anecdotal illustration may clarify my thesis. In the Fall 1987
issue of The Stanford Magazine, the Senior Editor referred to Justice
Thurgood Marshall as an "authority on the Constitution." 160 When in a
subsequent issue of the magazine a reader questioned this characterization of Justice Marshall, the Senior Editor offered a one-sentence rebuttal: "If a Supreme Court justice is not an authority on the Constitution,

pray tell, who

is?

1

61

There are at least two different senses of "authority" at issue here.
The author might have meant that all Supreme Court Justices are, in
fact, authorities on the Constitution because they all have (as it happens)
studied, pondered, and worked on constitutional issues long enough and
thoroughly enough to qualify as authorities. I suspect, however, that the
author is making the stronger claim that simply being a Supreme Court
Justice makes one, ipso facto, an authority on the Constitution. And
there is undeniably some truth to this: During his tenure as a Supreme
Court Justice, Justice Marshall was one of only nine people ultimately
empowered to "say what the law is" (as Chief Justice John Marshall put
it). Whatever he said (or even thought) undeniably mattered. And now
that Justice Marshall has retired, an even better way to make the distinction is to ask: In what sense, if any, does former Justice Marshall remain
an "authority" on the Constitution? Certainly, he is no longer an authority in the second sense, but he might still be considered one in the
first, which did not depend on his institutional role.
In our institutional scheme, the opinions of a Supreme Court Justice
carry inordinate weight just because they are opinions of a Supreme
Court Justice. "Institutional authority stems from the place of the institution among the available channels of ... political action."' 162 Thus,
another implication of judicial authority is power. In this sense, Chief
Justice Marshall is more than a little disingenuous in claiming that "Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the power of the laws, has no
160. THE STANFORD MAG., Fall 1987, at 24, 74 (letters to the editor).
161. THE STANFORD MAG., Spring 1988, at 20, 21 (letters to the editor).
162. BRIGHAM, supra note 142, at 31 (emphasis added); see also Posner, supra note 152, at 841
C" 'Authority' has a different connotation in law; indeed it is a different concept. Decisions are
authoritative not when they command a consensus among lawyers, corresponding to a consensus

among scientists, but when they emanate from the top of a hierarchy, normally a judicial one.").
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existence."1 63 Equally untenable is Alexander Hamilton's related claim,
which seems particularly remarkable today, that the judiciary will always
be "the least dangerous" branch of government, because "[t]he judiciary
...has no influence over either the sword or the purse, no direction
either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no
active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither Force
64
nor Will, but merely judgment ....
These claims sound strange and unconvincing today. Their authors
want to maintain that the judiciary has only intellectual authority and no
institutional authority. But as Alexis de Tocqueville observed 150 years
ago, "[n]o other nation ever constituted so powerful a judiciary as the
Americans."1 65 In subsequent sections of this Article, I examine the judiciary's questionable claims to intellectual authority and analyze in
some detail its many forms of institutional authority. But for now it is
important simply to distinguish institutional authority from intellectual
authority-which is always independently persuasive regardless of social
or institutional position, and regardless of power to impose one's personal views on others.
III.

THE DWINDLING INTELLECTUAL AUTHORITY OF THE COURT

It is strange to talk of Hercules when your starting point is Harry
Blackmun.
1 66
-John T. Noonan, Jr.
A possible objection to my position is: Why should our analysis
differ depending on how authority is generated? A preliminary answer
would be that it should not. In the following Sections, I apply such an
independent intellectual standard and demonstrate that the work of the
judiciary falls short when measured against such a standard. These Sections show just how much of the judiciary's authority might be termed
"unearned."
163. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824) (emphasis added).
Chief Justice Marshall continued:
Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. When they are said to
exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning
the course prescribed by law; and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of the Court to
follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the

Judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Legislature; or, in other
words, to the will of the law.

Ic
164. THE FEDERALm No. 78, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
165. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 135 (J. P. Mayer ed., 1966) (empha-

sis omitted).
166. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 174 (1976).
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Another way to phrase the objection is: Why isn't the "humanistic
theory of what judges do" related to "what judges do" in the same way
that philosophy of science is related to what scientists do? Philosophers
of science observe and record what working scientists do; they note, for
example, how scientists define problems, what working hypotheses are
employed, what standards of precision are appropriate, and what counts
as proof. One answer is that institutional authority is dictated not only
to and by judges; it also affects legal scholars. One can criticize Plessy v.
Ferguson,1 67 but one cannot really "say what the law is" without referring to the institutional authority of the judiciary. In this sense, "what
judges do" has an impact on the substance or content of legal theory.
Another reason the analogy does not hold is that humanistic legal
theory does not try to be the "humanistic theory of what judges do." It
is possible to imagine approaching the work-product of the judiciary the
way a philosopher of science approaches "what scientists do." But it
would not resemble the way "what judges do" is assimilated and appropriated in humanistic theories of law-where attention is firmly focused
on the supposed intellectual content of judicial decisionmaking, and the
judicial work-product is examined and interrogated with the same intellectual and methodological tools that are applied to any product of the
human intellect.
One could look outside judicial doctrine, language, and opinions for
other sources of law, 168 but humanistic legal scholars do not. Rather,
they focus exclusively on judicial opinions, but then use theories to explain them (from outside the law) that are conspicuously at odds with
our judicial system and the institutional realities of adjudication.
To return to the analogy with philosophy of science, it is as if "what
scientists do" is not simply being observed and recorded; "what judges
do" is being grappled with intellectually. It is as if "what scientists do"
has been elevated to the level of "philosophy of science." (It is, however,
easier to imagine such a study of "what judges do" being undertaken by a
social scientist.) The following Sections document the inappropriateness
of elevating "what judges do" to the level of "humanistic legal theory."
A.

The Institution of the Judiciary

Obviously, judges are "doctrinal" authorities. They have the power
or institutional authority to shape-indeed, create-legal doctrine. But
this does not mean that these judges are authoritative or even competent
167. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
168. See White, supra note 43, at 216-17.
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legal theorists. A systematic examination of the institutional setting of
adjudication makes this clear.
1. The JudicialAppointment Process-andIts Results. The constitutional process by which federal judges are selected, nominated, and
confirmed has always been inherently political. 169 It is not a process at
all suited for filtering out and anointing those with superior credentials as
legal theorists and philosophers.1 70 And today, as never before, the nation's political processes practically guarantee that those who attain the
offices of President and Senator will be eminently unqualified to undertake a searching, intellectually sophisticated inquiry into "judicial
1 71
philosophy."
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 agreed that
judicial nominees should be "fit characters," of the "requisite," "essential," or "proper" qualifications. 72 These terms were not defined, most
likely because the delegates had no special requirements in mind for the
judiciary, other than completely traditional, conventional ones.1 73 In designing an appointment process, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention were concerned primarily to ensure that "intrigue," "selfish
motives," and "flagrant partiality or error" did not enter into the
process. 174
Even these modest goals seem to have been elusive. For better or for
worse, the Supreme Court has never been, and never will be, a "meritocracy"-and for two main reasons: the President and the Senate. The
Constitution did not spell out any criteria for the President to apply in
making nominations, and it did not provide any institutional mechanism
for securing meaningful "advice" from the Senate or set any limitations
175
on its (essentially unreviewable) power to refuse "consent."'
169. See GEORGE J. LANKEVICH, THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE: THE FEDERAL
COURT, 1787-1801, at viii (1986); Henry P. Monaghan, The Confirmation Process" Law or Politics?,

101 HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1203 (1988).
170. See Stephen L.'Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1185, 1186-87 (1988).
171. See Monaghan, supra note 169, at 1210; Bruce Fein, Comment, A CircumscribedSenate
Confirmation Role, 102 HARv. L. REv. 672, 673 (1989).
172. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON PRINTING, DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION
OF THE UNION OF AMERICAN STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 154, 198-99, 430
(1925) [hereinafter ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUMENTS]; see also JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND
CONSENT OF THE SENATE 17-35 (1953); CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTIrUTION

176-79, 327-29, 639-43 (1937).
173. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 233 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966).
174. See ILLUSTRATIVE DOCUMENTS, supra note 172, at 153-54, 198-99, 429-31; see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 76, at 456-58 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
175. See Charles L. Black, Jr., A Note on SenatorialConsiderationof Supreme CourtNominees,
79 YALE LJ. 657 (1970); Monaghan, supra note 169, at 1205.
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According to Henry Abraham, there are four "historically demonstrable major motivations" or "ascertainable decisional reasons" 176 for
Presidents' selections of Supreme Court Justices: (1) objective merit; (2)
personal and political friendship; (3) balancing "representation" or "representativeness" on the Court; and (4) "real" political and ideological
compatibility. 177 In a similar vein, Charles Warren has noted that appointments to the Court "have not been made from a cloister of juridical
pedants, but from the mass of lawyers and Judges taking active parts in
the life of the country." 178 Presidents have felt free to emphasize personality, politics, geography, race, gender, and even religion in selecting Justices, often on the theory that the Court should be balanced or
representative.
The Senate, too, has its role to play in what Justice Frankfurter
called "that odd lottery by which men get picked for the Supreme
Court." 17 9 And here Warren's converse observation merits mention:
"The Senate, in rejecting for partisan reasons nominees of eminent legal
ability, has more than once influenced the course of history." 180
Although this result may seem undesirable, there is nothing to suggest
that it is somehow unconstitutional; "all the relevant historical and textual sources support the Senate's power when and if it sees fit to assert its
vision of the public good against that of the President." 18 Short of
breaching some independent constitutional restriction-such as the
Equal Protection Clause-the Senate may, in effect, decline to confirm a
judicial nominee for any reason it sees fit to invoke, or indeed for no
reason at all.' 8 2 The primary restraint on the Senate's confirmation
power is thus political, rather than legal, accountability.
The most recent nomination experiences offer the best available evidence as to the standards and criteria now, and for the future, to be applied in the selection and confirmation of Justices to the U.S. Supreme
176. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 5-6 (2d ed. 1985); see also LANKEVICH,
supra note 169; Ronald Dworkin, The Reagan Revolution and the Supreme Court, N.Y. REV. o
BOOKS, July 18, 1991, at 23; Timothy B. Tomas & Jess A. Velona, Note, All the President'sMen? A
Study ofRonald Reagan'sAppointments to the US. Courts ofAppeals, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 766, 768
(1987).
177. ABRAHAM, supra note 176, at 323-24.
178.

1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 2 (rev. ed.

1926).
179. Felix Frankfurter, Learned Hand's Fiftieth Anniversary as a FederalJudge, in OF LAW
AND LIFE & OTHER THINGS THAT MATTER 135 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1967).

180. WARREN, supra note 178, at 2-3.
181. Monaghan, supra note 169, at 1204.
182. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 74-76 (2d ed. 1991); Monaghan,
supra note 169, at 1206-08 & n.20 (pondering an additional "structural" limitation- 'the Senate
may not act so as materially to impair the functioning of the Court"--without being sure, however,
"where this potential limitation leads").
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Court. 183 The Senate, like the Presidency, is a historical institution that
operates in a context of tradition, custom, and precedent. Especially
where the Constitution is silent, the Senate defines its role and refines its
rules through a political process of usage, acquiescence, and accommodation. 184 The rules of the confirmation game have been changed,185and in
the future it will no longer be possible to play by the old rules.
As it is presently conceived, there is a perverse kind of logic at work

in the judicial appointment process. As things now stand, the Senate is
probably incapable of making a truly searching, sophisticated, and intellectually respectable inquiry into the "judicial philosophy" of a nomi-

nee-should it even attempt to do
attempt to do

So.

187

so.

1 86

Usually, of course, it does not

But the Bork hearings set an unforgettable prece-

dent to the effect that a more intrusive form of "philosophical" review is
now availablefor nominees who invite it-for example, by publishing con-

troversial and highly visible scholarly works that challenge the legitimacy of important constitutional doctrines. So now, instead of having
just one way to curtail the intellectual authority of the Court, the Senate

actually has three: It can misapply intrusive philosophical review for
nominees who present strong, highly developed intellectual credentials;
(more likely) it can scare away such nominees in the first place by discouraging their nomination by the President; and (most likely of all) it
can confirm obscure, mediocre, and uncontroversial nominees. The
"perversity" inheres in the circumstance that the very availability of a
183. The cases of the most recent nominees to the Supreme Court are particularly illuminating
for what they reveal about the nomination process and the criteria now employed in the selection of
Supreme Court Justices. Anthony M. Kennedy, like Harry Blackmun, was a third choice. Robert
Bork, President Reagan's first choice for the seat vacated by Justice Powell, was a prominent law
professor at Yale Law School, had served as Solicitor General of the United States, and at the time
of his nomination was a leading judge on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Judge Bork had developed and articulated over the years, in numerous influential scholarly writings,
a powerful (if extreme) legal philosophy; he was, according to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Joseph Biden, "a leading-perhaps the leading proponent of a provocative constitutional philosophy." Bork Hearings,supra note 12, at 95 (emphasis added).
184. See Madeline Morris, The Grammar of Advice and Consent Senate Confirmation of
Supreme Court Nominees, 38 DRAKE L. REv. 863, 864 (1988-1989) (attempting to "articulate and
then evaluate the practice that the Senate has developed to govern criteria for advice and consent
decisions").
185. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION at xi (expanded ed. 1988).
186. See Monaghan, supra note 169, at 1203; see also Bork Hearings, supra note 12, at 2525
(statement of Thomas C. Grey).
187. See, e.g., Nomination ofJudge Antonin Scalia to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States" HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 33
(1986) [hereinafter Scalia Hearings](testimony of Antonin Scalia) ("I do not think I should answer
questions regarding any specific Supreme Court opinion, even one as fundamental as Marbury v.
Madison.").
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more intense, more intrusive form of scrutiny (whether used or not) is
actually associated with a palpable lowering of intellectual standards.188
The post-Bork appointment strategies (Ginsburg, Kennedy, Souter,
Thomas) should thus be viewed not as anomalies, but as carefully-and
painfully-calculated responses in, and to, a political and legal climate
that tends to "skew the process in favor of judicial nominees who have
eschewed writing and speaking on vexing and contentious legal issues."1 9 Seen in that light, these most recent experiences exhibit a certain internal logic, and they confirm that intellectual authority is, as
never before, a precipitately vanishing factor in the appointment process.
"[S]omething's seriously amiss," lamented one commentator in the Wall
Street Journal at the time of the Souter nomination, "when an unknown
record becomes a huge advantage in Washington." 190 What is "amiss" is
simply that the myth of judicial intellectual authority, despite all evidence and experience to the contrary, still persists.
2. The "BureaucraticWriting" of JudicialOpinions. Even under
the best of circumstances, judicial opinions only imperfectly approximate
the unified intellectual product of a discerning mind. 191 As Harry Wellington has put it, "majority opinions are desperately negotiated documents and not the carefully crafted work of a philosopher." 192 For the
simple reason that judicial decisions are in some sense authored by a
"committee," it is difficult to conceive of them as primary or original
sources. "Only a man wholly out of touch with reality could expect an
opinion writer [holding together a 5-to-4 majority] to 'illumine large areas of the law,' "193 wrote Thurman Arnold. "He would find that men
can sometimes agree on a result, but rarely on all of the reasons for that
result, and that attempts to spell out reasons may be futile."' 94 More
188.
189.
190.
191.

See Fein, supra note 171, at 673, 683.
Id at 683.
Justice Who?, WALL ST. J., July 24, 1990, at A14.
See PAUL BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 1097-98 (1975)
(quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER, CONVERSATIONS WITH MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER 292-96 (Oral
History Collection of Columbia University (1956)) ("When you have to have at least five people to
agree on something, they can't have that comprehensive completeness of candor which is open to a
single man, giving his own reasons untrammeled by what anybody else may do or not do if he put
that out.").
192. Harry H. Wellington, Challengesto Legal Education: The "Two Cultures"Phenomenon,37
J.LEGAL EDUC. 327, 329 (1987). See generally Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82 (1986) (analyzing the group decisionmaking process within
multi-member courts).
193. Thurman Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1298, 1312 (1960).
194. Id. For a spectacular depiction of this situation, see Mark Tushnet, The Optimist's Tale,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 1257, 1263-65 (1984) (reviewing THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983)).
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recently, the inconsistency and instability inherent in group decisionmaking have been explained in formal terms by Kenneth Arrow, 195 and this
analysis has been applied to the work of the Supreme Court by Frank
19 6
Easterbrook.
At a second level, judicial opinions cannot be viewed as the unified
product of an original mind because they are, increasingly, not even written by a judge or Justice. They are largely "ghostwritten" by law
clerks. 197 Such a procedure would never be tolerated in "normal" intellectual disciplines, and especially in humanistic scholarship-which
again shows how much the humanists' original sources differ from judicial opinions. 198 It has further been suggested that the increasing reliance on law clerks is at least partially responsible for doctrinal
breakdown in the modem Supreme Court and the tendency toward separate opinions and plurality decisions: "Because each Justice has .a
number of law clerks and typically none serves more than one or two
years, a heroic effort by a Justice would be required to impart unity of
philosophy and authorship to the law clerks' drafts."' 199
In discussing the Court's steadily increasing workload, the Freund
Committee warned in 1972: "If trends continue, as there is every reason
to believe they will, and if no relief is provided, the function of the Court
must necessarily change." 20° There are increasing indications that the
function of the Court has changed over time, and that one is no longer
entitled to consider the work of a Justice as analogous to that of a poet or
philosopher, i.e., as the intellectual product of a unified mind. In other
words, at the same time that legal scholarship is becoming more ambitious, more theoretical, and more creative, Supreme Court opinions are
becoming less so-less the product of an individual and powerful mind,
195. See KENNETH 3. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 92-120 (2d ed.
1963).
196. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. REV. 802, 813-32
(1982).
197. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 105-19 (1985).
198. See Posner, supra note 9, at 1352 ("The literary character of judicial opinions ... is an
interesting and significant phenomenon, though regrettably a diminishing one, as more and more
opinions are ghostwritten by newly graduated law students neither chosen for nor encouraged in
literary flair."); see also Patricia M. Wald, Selecting Law Clerks, 89 MICH. L. REv. 152, 153-54
(1990).

199. Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term-Foreword Freedom of Expression in the
Burger Court, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1, 72 (1980). But see Note, PluralityDecisions and JudicialDecisionmaking, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1127, 1135 n.57 (1981) ("A Justice writing a lead opinion will value
the support of his fellow Justices more than the good will of his clerks, and the Justices will surely
make their own decision whether or not to write an opinion. It is also unlikely that the Justices
would continue a practice they thought caused plurality decisions.").
200. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASE LOAD OF THE
(1972) [hereinafter FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT].
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less an original text or primary source providing a theoretical model for
scholarship, and more the product of "bureaucratic writing" by law
clerks. 20 1 The point is not so much that the Justices have not written
their opinions; no one has written them. They are the proverbial "work
of many hands."
It is tempting to read the obscure, formulaic pronouncements of
Supreme Court opinions as heavily freighted with deep significations that
human language can only imperfectly capture. But perhaps a simpler
interpretation is that:
most constitutional law casebooks are forced by coverage pressure to
print only a small part of most opinions. The Court's formulas always
survive the editing process. Supreme Court clerks mastered those formulas and were rewarded with high grades; the formulas
may be the
20 2
only way they know of doing constitutional law.
It is difficult, for example, to imagine a present-day law clerk drafting the
following passage:
A hypothetical claim resting on abstract assumptions is now for the
first time made the basis for affording illusory relief for a particular evil
even though it foreshadows deeper and more pervasive difficulties in
consequence. The claim is hypothetical and the assumptions are abstract because the Court does not vouchsafe the lower courts-state
and federal-guidelines for formulating specific, definite, wholly unprecedented remedies for the inevitable litigations that today's umbrageous disposition is bound to stimulate in connection with politically
motivated reapportionments in so many States. In such a setting, to
promulgate jurisdiction in the abstract is meaningless. It is as devoid
of reality as "a brooding omnipresence in the sky," for it conveys no
intimation what relief, if any, a District Court is capable of affording
that would not invite legislatures to play ducks and drakes with the
judiciary .... 203
That passage is unmistakably the product of a brilliant, original (if somewhat egotistical) mind.2°4 The same inimitable judicial style and personal philosophy can be detected in Justice Frankfurter's West Virginia
201. See JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN 47 (1986); Robert
V. Nagel, The FormulaicConstitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 177-78 (1985).
202. Douglas Laycock, Notes on the Role of JudicialReview, the Expansion of FederalPower,
and the Structure of ConstitutionalRights, 99 YALE L.J. 1711, 1742-43 (1990) (reviewing ROBERT
F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL
REvIEw (1989)).
203. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267-68 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
204. See JAMEs F. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGo BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN MODERN AMERICA 251 (1989) ("[The emotionally charged message was
Frankfurter's own."). Of course, the true test of originality is whether one has inspired any parodies.
See, eg., Richard H. Field, Frankfurter,J., Concurring.... 71 HARV. L. REV. 77 (1957).
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State Board of Education v. Barnette dissent, which he insisted on beginning with a personal statement about belonging to "the most vilified and
'20 5
persecuted minority in history.
In writing his Barnette dissent, Frankfurter included the passage
quoted above against his law clerk's advice (reportedly with the reminder
that "this is my opinion, not yours"). 20 6 Frankfurter also disregarded
similar advice from two of his fellow Justices, who "called formally on
Frankfurter in his Chambers to plead with him to omit or soften this
opening paragraph. They said it was too emotional and too personal for
inclusion in a Supreme Court opinion. Frankfurter said they had given
him very good reasons for taking these words out, but he had even better
'20 7
reasons for keeping them in; and in they stayed.
Robert Ferguson has also addressed some of the issues I have raised
about the role of law clerks in the judicial process. 20 8 In so doing, however, Ferguson only strengthens my case. He writes:
As judges relinquish more and more aspects of the judicial opinion to
their court clerks, or even to groups of clerks, there is some reason to
qualify the designation of "personal" or "individual" writing. But to
qualify does not mean to discard the idea altogether. As long as the
actual written product remains "the self-conscious measure" of judicial
performance, clerks will write with the style and philosophy of their
judge in mind, and judges will monitor language and ideas to make
sure that opinions remain in some sense their own. Clerks, in other
words, work within the assumption of a personalized authority in the
genre of the judicial opinion. The same assumption, that of a personal
authority in the very form of the statement, also nourishes the interest
and involvement
of the imputed author, the judge who signs the
09
opinion.2
Now this is, to say the very least, a decidedly weak defense of the judicial
opinion as an original text or primary source. It must be a very rudimentary and insubstantial judicial "style" or even "philosophy" that can be
mastered so readily by the youthful law clerk, even one who is dutifully
"work[ing] within the assumption of a personalized authority in the
genre of the judicial opinion." And presumably only very casual philosophers or literati would be content to "monitor language and ideas" to

205. 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
206. See SIMON, supra note 204, at 118.

207.

MAX FREEDMAN, ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE,

1928-

1945, at 701 (1967).
208. See Robert Ferguson, The JudicialOpinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201

(1990).
209. Id. at 202 n.5 (emphasis added).
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make sure that their works remained "in some sense their own." Ferguson, undeterred, devotes the remainder of his article to an extended analysis of the Minersville School DistrictBoard of Education v. Gobitis2 10 and
Barnette cases, and mainly to Justice Frankfurter's opinions in those
cases. My point precisely. Justice Frankfurter's opinions are exceptions,
and rather notable ones at that; they are so exceptional and atypical that
I used them myself in the above discussion, as an excellent point of contrast with current judicial practice. Ferguson takes what he terms his
"proving ground" of examples exclusively from these two cases in the
early 1940s, when the Court had far fewer cases-and the Justices had
far fewer law clerks-than they do today. This is undoubtedly what
made those examples seem "particularly useful for present purposes";
namely, for supporting the popular but largely unexamined assumption
that judicial opinions are "uniquely personal literary product[s]" that
'2 11
form "a distinct literary genre."
B.

The Unedifying Practice of Adjudication

A standard and familiar distinction used to provide context for explaining the practice of adjudication is the distinction between the work
of the judge and that of the politician. Douglas Laycock, for example,
gives one version of this familiar distinction:
Courts must give reasons, articulate general principles, and live with
their precedents. A series of cases will pressure courts to draw precise
lines-to say that this plaintiff wins and that a similar but not quite
identical plaintiff loses. Judicial emphasis on principle tends to push
arguments to their limit instead of toward acceptable compromise.
Politicians and elected officials can finesse controversies with fuzzy
language, by avoiding statements of principle, by agreeing on the result
without agreeing on reasons, or by not offering reasons at all. Politicians can also engage in occasional emergency suppression without
publishing records, without stating formal justifications, and without
treating their actions as precedent. Judges have much more difficulty
212
using these techniques.
Without putting too fine a point on the matter, it may be replied
that judges use all of these techniques-naturally, regularly, and with no
discernible "difficulty." Although common law judges may feel obligated to justify their decisions by providing reasons for them, the legal
authority of judicial opinions rests not so much on the strength of their
210. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
211. Ferguson, supra note 208, at 202-03.
212. Laycock, supra note 202, at 1714-15 (footnotes omitted). For another classic expression of
this distinction, see Arnold, supra note 193, at 1310-14.
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reasoning as on the judges' place in the institutional scheme. As Good'2 13 Our syshart observed, "[a] bad reason may often make good law."
tem of case law grants precedential authority to poorly reasoned and well
reasoned opinions alike; indeed, the system offers powerful rationales for
leaving legal mistakes in place, instead of correcting them. "[I]n most
matters," noted Justice Brandeis, "it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right."' 2 14 This is because
the concerns of judges are not abstract or theoretical, but practical and
prudential---disposing of a contentious case, for example, in circumstances where the court's authority is delicately balanced between grudging acceptance by the public and lukewarm support from the other
branches of government. The better part of judicial valor may be to
"muddle through" (as Alexander Bickel put it215) with a patched-together pastiche of partial reasons, rather than to construct a sweeping
intellectual synthesis that is, however, wholly out of touch with social
and political reality. 2 16 In short, the philosophical virtues of rational coherence, consistency, and completeness are not the operative criteria of
2 17
legal decisionmaking, and may even be detrimental to that enterprise.
As Laycock also observed: "If coherence and stability are the criteria,
almost any consistently applied theory could do better than the Court
has done. ' 2 18 It thus cannot be assumed that the body of judicial doctrine forms anything like a philosophical system. To base a legal theory
on such an assumption is to build it upon a house of cards.
In effect, the distinction between the work of politicians and that of
judges has been vastly but understandably overrated. "These are the
clothes which the Court must wear in order to retain its authority and
213. Arthur L. Goodhart, Determiningthe Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 163
(1930).
214. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
215. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 64 (1962)
216. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV.79
(1959).
217. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("General propositions do not decide concrete cases."); Oliver W. Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the
Law, 5 AM. L. REv. 1 (1870). Our judges and Justices are not really "theoretiians"-they cannot
afford to be--because "unlike their critics, [they] bear the responsibility of decision. People who
bear that responsibility soon learn that the welter of life is constantly churning up situations in which
the application of clear and consistent theories would produce unacceptable results... because the
case has stirred some profound countervailing principle." Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectiveson
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv.349, 351 (1974). In a hard situation, the scholars and
critics can "postpone their articles, change their topics, take a sabbatical, or otherwise procrastinate
till muddy waters clear." Id. at 351-52. By contrast, "[t]he Supreme Court ordinarily must decide
the case before it. It must do so even though it is not prepared to announce the new principle in
terms of comparable generality with the old ....." Id. at 352.
218. Laycock, supra note 202, at 1715.
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public appearance. '' 2 19 In the following sections of this Article, I shall
document and explain this view of adjudication.
1. "The Passive Virtues" and the PragmaticJudicialRole. In this
first subsection I trace out some of the predominant ways and reasons
that adjudication is and must be non-theoretical. These are at the same
time ways and reasons judges do not provide apt models for theory, and
legal opinions do not resemble original texts or primary sources like
220
those in the humanities.
One way of considering the non-theoretical nature of adjudication is
to view it in relation to principles of judicial restraint. These principles
make more sense in some contexts than in others, but in any event they
are deeply embedded in our legal system. 221 Numerous features of the
Anglo-American legal system operate to restrain judges from "roaming
the stormy fields ...their black robes flapping in the winds of controversy ... .,"222 Courts decide only questions presented to them by litigants who properly invoke their jurisdiction. 223 Party presentation of
224
evidence and argument is a mainstay of the adversary system of proof.
These factors allow the judge to assume a passive role not unlike that of a
referee. 225 Common law judges do not seek out their cases or perform
investigative functions, as they do in some civil law jurisdictions.
Article III of the Constitution provides that federal courts have ju'226
risdiction to adjudicate various types of "Cases" and "Controversies.
This has been interpreted to mean that "advisory opinions" will not be
offered, as Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson discovered in 1793 when
he asked the Supreme Court to construe certain treaties in light of the
219. Arnold, supra note 193, at 1311.
220. Again, the contrast with the civil law tradition is instructive. See MERRYMAN, supra note
129, at 63-64; REDLICH, supra note 148, at 36.
The civil law scholar does something very different from the task of a common law judge; the
scholar develops theory. Elsewhere Professor Merryman describes the Continental legal scholar as
"mold[ing] the civil law tradition and the formal materials of the law into a model of the legal
system." MERRYMAN, supra note 129, at 60 (emphasis added).
221. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 29, 31-32 (1968); Collier,
supra note 83, at 773-75; see also BICKEL, supra note 215, at 111-16; ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 1-20 (1957); Alexander M. Bickel, The
Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961); Maurice
Kelman, The Forked Path of Dissent, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 227, 271-72.
222. Thurman Arnold, Judge Jerome Frank,24 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 634 (1957).

223. See LEVY, supra note 221, at 31-32.
224. See PAUL D. CARRINGTON & BARBARA A. BABCOCK, CIVIL PROCEDURE 406-09 (2d ed.

1980).
225. The normal passivity of the judge is described in Federal Rule of Evidence 103, which
delineates the judge's role when ruling on the admissibility of evidence and the proper recourse for
parties subjected to adverse rulings.
226. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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ongoing war between France and England. 227 The Justices declined, citing separation of powers and checks and balances considerations. 228 The
federal Declaratory Judgments Act2 2 9 has similarly been interpreted to
apply only where there is a justiciable "case or controversy" within the

meaning of Article

111.230

These restraints on judicial intervention provide a useful background against which to view the roles of the judge and the legal scholar.
Briefly, the requirements of Article III-justiciability, standing, finality,
and narrow grounds of decision-all reflect an abhorrence of abstract
judicial theorizing at the expense of actual litigants. To be sure (as I
shall elaborate in the following subsection 231), an appellate court of last
resort is not doing its job or its duty and is not fulfilling its "historic and
essential functions ' 2 32 if it issues only narrow, fact-specific holdings that
do not expound or explain the law to lower courts and to other potential
litigants. But, as compared to philosophical or literary theorizing, the
questions a judge or even a Justice faces are by nature more mundane,
even when formulated generally. Relatively speaking, judicial doctrine is
inherently empirical and specific-"case-specific" in this limited sense.
Between the two extremes I have indicated, it appears that the major participants have assumed the worst possible postures-that is, at the
extremes. Anthony Kronman has documented the emergence of a new
"rationalism" (actually, several new rationalisms) in legal theory, and the
rationalist tendencies he describes can be detected in the specific legal
theories and forms of legal scholarship that I criticize. 233 Typically,
these theories take their point of departure from a few abstract postulates
about human nature and a conception of society as a blank slate upon
which social and legal principles may be written. 234 Other legal rationalists seek to expound deep structural regularities (usually expressed in
philosophical terms of the utmost generality) that allegedly underlie the
"surface confusion" of established legal doctrines.23 5 In general, these
forms of abstract theorizing completely fail to consider the "details" of
227. See

PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WEcHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE

FEDERAL SYSTEM 64-70 (3d ed. 1988).
228. See id.
229. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988).
230. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937).

231. See infra notes 240-46 and accompanying text.
232. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT, supra note 200, at 5.
233. See Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567,
1598-1605 (1985).
234. See id.at 1571-72.

at 1606-07.
235. See id.
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social and historical context within which legal decisionmaking necessarily occurs. To the extent that they are supposed to be generalizations of
judicial practice, they succeed only in abstracting from or ignoring the
pragmatic, situated agenda of the judiciary, as I have described it above.
Where the legal theorists and scholars have taken an impossibly
high road, the courts-and particularly the Court-have increasingly
captured the low ground. I shall document and discuss these developments in the following subsections, but for now it is instructive to note
that this striking divergence of legal theory from judicial practice makes
the claims of grand legal theory even more implausible than they otherwise would be.
2. Adjudication as a Debate. The symbolism-perhaps unconscious, and certainly unexamined-of the "debate" is symptomatic of the
problems I have pointed out, and the motif of the debate is often unthinkingly applied to adjudication on the grand scale, particularly that of
the U.S. Supreme Court. The "debate" model has led to the attribution
of important theoretical positions to courts and of significant intellectual
roles to the Justices. Because the Justices often consider large, important
issues, and continually issue position papers on them, it seems natural to
think of adjudication as an ongoing debate. But in the broader sense of
"public debate" on the great issues of the day, courts are structurally
insulated from having to summon up popular support for their views and
cannot in this sense really be characterized as carrying on a public debate
in their opinions.
In the narrower sense of "a debate," adjudication presents even
more striking differences. The prevailing side gets to enforce its victory
at law; it prevails only because it has more votes, not because it has the
stronger argument or is "right"-as determined by some higher authority, such as informed professional opinion, social consensus, or human
history. Theoretically, the Court does not have to offer any reasons for
its decisions; in practice, cases are disposed of more often than not in per
curiam decisions or by "summary action"-without any argument, reason, or opinion. 23 6 The conception of the Court "as essentially a voice of
authority settling by virtue of its own ipse dixit the questions that duly
come before it, or that it chooses to permit to come before it... unhappily seems to underlie some of the Court's own actions."2 3 7 In these
236. See Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purposeand the JudicialPro-

cess The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv.L. REv. 1, 3 (1957); Ernest J. Brown, The Supreme Court,
1957 Term-Foreword: Process ofLaw, 72 HARV. L. REv. 77 (1958); Herbert Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 22-23 (1959).
237. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84, 98 (1959).
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circumstances, adjudication exhibits only superficial similarity to a real
debate; in all its essential attributes, it is an exercise of institutional
authority. 238
If the Supreme Court is carrying on a "debate" in its judicial opinions, who or what is the audience? The other Justices? There is little
(and increasingly less) to suggest that the Justices are intent on persuading each other, through intellectual argumentation, to change their
minds on fundamental issues-that is, on matters that might make a difference in "legal theory." The proliferation of separate opinions is only
the most visible symptom of this "pathological decisionmaking" that has
left "juridical cripples" strewn throughout the pages of the United States
2 39
Reports.
238. In 1959, Henry Hart expressed his concern that the "process of collective deliberation of
individuals, gifted or otherwise, who recognize that the wisdom of all, if it is successfully pooled, will
usually transcend the wisdom of any," was not resulting in a consistent "maturing of collective
thought" at the U.S. Supreme Court. Id at 100; see also HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3 (1961); Erwin N. Griswold, Of Time and Attitudes-Professor
Hartand JudgeArnold, 74 HARV. L. REv. 81 (1960). But see Arnold, supra note 193 (noting cases,
primarily civil rights cases, that contradict Hart's conclusion).
If contemporary trends are any indication, the Court is rapidly moving ever farther from the
model of a Burkean "deliberative assembly" and the "process of collective deliberation" envisioned
by Hart. One such indication is the fact that, through the 1979 Term, the Burger Court had made
more decisions by a mere plurality than had been made in the entire previous history of the Supreme
Court. See Note, supra note 199, at 1127 n.1, 1147. There were 45 plurality decisions between 1801
and shortly after the beginning of the Warren Court in 1955, 42 between 1955 and the end of the
Warren Court, and 88 from the beginning of the Burger Court through the 1979 Term. See John F.
Davis & William L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: PluralityOpinions in the Supreme Court, 1974
DUKE L.J. 59, 60; Comment, Supreme CourtNo-Clear-MajorityDecisions: A Study in Stare Decisis,
24 U. CHI. L. REv. 99, 99 n.4 (1956). The trend toward split decisions has made a modern mockery
of "the opinion of the Court," see generally Karl M. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme
Court: A History of JudicialDisintegration,44 CORNELL L.Q. 186 (1959) (reviewing the history of
split opinions on the Supreme Court, and its costs and benefits), with the nine separate opinions in
Furman v. Georgia representing a low-water mark of sorts; in Furman, none of the opinions of the
five Justices in the majority could obtain the concurrence of any other members of the Court. See
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam); see also BREST, supra note 191, at 82 n.76
("[E]ach justice wrote a separate opinion concurring in or dissenting from the Court's judgment,
which was announced in a short per curiam opinion."); Robert Weisberg, DeregulatingDeath, 1983
Sup. CT. REv. 305, 315 ("Furman ... is not so much a case as a badly orchestrated opera, with nine
characters taking turns to offer their own arias."). In Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), four members of the Court found it necessary to remind four other
members of the Court-none of whom could find the right words to command a majority-that "[i]t
is hardly necessary to state that only a majority can speak for the Court or determine what is the
'central meaning' of any judgment of the Court." Id at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part, joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart, J., and Rehnquist, J.); see also STEPHEN WASBY,
THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 233-36 (3d ed. 1988). Even the comparatively tame facts of Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)--concerning an Oklahoma statute that
prohibited the sale of beer containing 3.2% alcohol to males, but not females, between the ages of 18
and 21-generated seven separate opinions. For other examples, see Note, supra note 199, at 112829.
239. See Davis & Reynolds, supra note 238, at 77; Note, supra note 199, at 1127-28.
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When the Justices of the Court cannot agree on their ratiodecidendi
they abdicate the expository and explanatory function of adjudication.
Bare announcements of decisions, unsupported by reasons, do not suffice
as statements of the law; they do not illuminate, explain, expound, or
declare "what the law is." One of the historically important functions of
appellate courts, and particularly of courts of last resort, has been the
heuristic function of teaching and educating parties and institutions as to
their legal rights and duties. 240 Another important function of appellate
adjudication is to provide guidance to lower courts. 24 1 Where it is impossible to integrate judicial opinions into a coherent body of law, these
functions cannot be served. 242
An obvious external manifestation of the Court's contemporary failure to fulfill its "historic and essential functions" 243 is the emergence of
fact-specific decisions that seem to turn on increasingly narrow distinctions. One cannot understand or learn from a bare decision, such as
"judgment for the plaintiff," because one is not thereby enlightened as to
"what it was" about the plaintiff's case that made the decisive difference.
For that, one needs reflection on a higher order that makes sense of the
particular facts of the specific case. We need to know what these specific
facts "mean," and it is this that drives us beyond them. In other words,
the Court must expound relatively broad, general rules and principles if
we are to understand its decisions and learn from them. 244
The inner manifestations of breakdown in judicial decisionmaking
are the distrust of general rules, the avoidance of objective principles, the
elimination of publicly ascertainable and demonstrable grounds of decision, and, finally, the abdication of reason and logic as primary bases for
decisionmaking and of rational argumentation as the medium of legal
discourse. As the following subsection demonstrates, judicial decisionmaking is always threatening to break down in this way, even in a highly
developed legal system. Constant vigilance and enormous intellectual exertions are required to keep legal discourse artificially raised to the level
240. See Collier, supra note 83, at 822.
241. See Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 682 (1986) (reviewing BER-

(1985)); Frederick
Schauer, Refining the Lawmaking Function of the Supreme Court, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 1 (1983).
NARD ScHwARTz, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT

242. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT, supra note 200, at 9; cf. BICKEL, supra note

156, at 32 ("IT]he function of the Court is not to correct error in individual cases, but to declare and
harmonize national law."); Kelman, supra note 221, at 266 ("[Trhe Supreme Court's raison d'etre is
not to dispense justice in the relative handful of cases it is possible to hear but to settle the troublesome questions presented by these cases.").
243. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT, supra note 200, at 5.

244. See Collier, supra note 83, at 822.
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of "a rational statement which formulates grounds and exposes connecting or logical links"; the natural, and much easier, tendency is a sort of
regression to the mean, to "arbitrary dicta, accepted by the parties to a
'24 5
controversy only because of the authority or prestige of the'judge.
This regression may be considered complete when the Court no longer
commands any "intellectual authority" at all but must rely solely on
whatever "institutional authority" it retains as the basis for its decisions
and influence. As Archibald Cox warned in 1980:
Perhaps the fragmentation is just one more symptom of a highly individualistic, inward-looking period. Perhaps it results from the breaking down of an older body of law under the pressures of legal
positivism and legal realism.... But the Supreme Court has additional

functions.... Continuous fragmentation could well diminish
not only
2 46
the influence of the Court but the ideal of the rule of law.

3. The Calculus of Precedent. With the departure ofJustices
Brennan and Marshall, the role of precedent and the doctrine of stare
decisis are certain to assume central importance in coming years, as a
significantly more conservative Court confronts the increasingly inconvenient holdings of its predecessors. 24 7 Timely new legal and policy rationales for the prevailing regime of institutional authority have been
245. John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 24 (1924).
246. Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term-Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the

Burger Court, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1, 72 (1980).
More recent judicial pronouncements indicate that Cox's concerns were, if anything, understated. In 1985 Justice Rehnquist, on the losing end of a five-to-four vote, penned a four-sentence
dissenting opinion that mentioned-without discussing- no fewer than four separate approaches,
"under any one of [which] the judgment in these cases should be affirmed." Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Without pondering further this remarkable case of multiple judicial oversight, Justice Rehnquist simply
and abruptly ended with an ominous warning: "I do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent
to spell out further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again command the
support of a majority of this Court." Id.
The final stage in the deterioration ofjudicial "debate" would be represented by the elimination
of debate before it has begun. There are indications that this stage has now been reached at the
Supreme Court. At the end of its 1989 Term, the Court carried over only 56 cases into the new
Term; the comparable number for the previous year was 81 cases; the year before that, the number
was 105. Linda Greenhouse, Mysteryfor Court Case of the DwindlingDocket, N.Y. TiMEs, July 9,
1990, at A10. Observers of the Court have noted for some time that the Justices are accepting fewer
and fewer cases for decision, despite the fact that the number of appeals continues to rise. In terms
of hours of oral argument scheduled at the beginning of the new Term, there has been a drop of 40%
over the previous two years, while the number of appeals reaching the Court actually increased. I.
247. See, eg., Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2623 n.2 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(providing a list of "endangered precedents"); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Casefor Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1060, 1062 (1991) ("Of course, Justice Brennan's departure from the
Court adds further uncertainty about doctrinal developments in this area, including the longevity of
Metro Broadcasting.").
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obligingly provided by Justice Scalia. In South Carolina v. Gathers,248 a
death penalty case, Justice Scalia impatiently urged the Court to overrule
Booth v. Maryland,249 a two-year-old precedent set by Justice Powell
shortly before his retirement. In so doing he addressed concerns, expressed by Justice Stevens in an earlier case, regarding:
the potential damage to the legal system that may be caused by frequent or sudden reversals of direction that may appear to have been
occasioned by nothing more significant than a change in the identity of
this Court's personnel.... Citizens must have confidence that the rules
on which they rely in ordering their affairs... are rules of law and not
merely the opinions of a small group of men who temporarily occupy
high office. 250
Justice Scalia met the implied charge of head-counting straightforwardly:
"I doubt that overruling Booth will so shake the citizenry's faith in the
Court" 25 1-perhaps because the citizenry's "faith" in the intellectual authority.of the Court is,
for good reasons, already at such a low level that
it cannot possibly be further shaken. He added that "[o]verrulings of
precedent rarely occur without a change in the Court's personnel. '2 52 It
is but a short step from this to saying: "Overrulings of precedent occur
because of changes in the Court's personnel," a position implicitly espoused by the dissenters in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, 253 who noted approvingly that the unprecedented decision in
NationalLeague of Cities had "follow[ed] some changes in the composition of the Court"-namely, the arrival of the four Nixon appointees, all
of whom voted in the five-member majority. 254
For Justice Scalia, the only distinctive feature of Gathers was the
fact that, as he blandly put it, "the overruling would follow not long after
the original decision. '2 55 But that in itself is, he continued, "hardly unprecedented"-there is no lack of precedent, as it were, for not following
precedent. 2 56 "Indeed, I had thought that the respect accorded prior decisions increases, rather than decreases, with their antiquity, as the society adjusts itself to their existence, and the surrounding law becomes
248. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
249. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
250. Florida Dep't of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
251. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 824 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
252. Id
253. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
254. Id at 558 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
255. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 824 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
256. For another case citing precedent for the power to overrule precedent, see Alferitz v. Borgwardt, 58 P. 460 (Cal. 1899).
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premised upon their validity. ' 2 57 In other words, there is a kind of "reliance interest" in legal precedent. 258 Conversely, when judicial error has
recently been made, its freshness "counsels that the opportunity of correction be seized at once, before state and federal laws and practices have

been adjusted to embody

''
it. 259

There is a certain logic to Justice Scalia's position here. He seems to
grant that the day-to-day decisionmaking of the Court is devoid of intellectual authority, although it still of course retains bare institutional authority. In close cases this can present a precarious appearance, as in the
period following National League of Cities, when the law of the land
seemed to depend almost entirely "on whether Justice Blackmun, the
crucial vote to establishing a majority on this issue, would find that a
federal law could or could not be applied to state and local governments
through the use of his rather undefined balancing test.' '260 Justice Roberts's role in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,2 61 as the so-called "switch
in time that saved nine,"' 262 and Justice Powell's role in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 263 as a kind of roving ambassador,
presented similar situations. "The possibility that Justice Blackmun's
votes will have first created and then destroyed a major constitutional
doctrine obviously raises troubling concerns about the judicial process. '' 264 These concerns do not mean that the Court's institutionalauthority is or was seriously in question; but they do suggest that the
meteoric rise and precipitate decline of the "National League of Cities
doctrine" (whatever that was) had little to do with the internal logic of
legal reasoning, and that the Court's pronouncements to the contrary
cannot be taken at face value, as "doctrinal artifacts" requiring, or meriting, extended intellectual attention. 265 During the period following NationalLeague of Cities, of course, legal scholars were taking the supposed
doctrine of that case very seriously, attempting to make some sense out of
257. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 824 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
258. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2610 (1991); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160,
190 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 235-39 (1924)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
259. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 824 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
260. JOHN E. NowAK ET AL., CONsTrrunTONAL LAW 165-66 (3d ed. 1986).
261. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
262. See Philip Frickey, Stare Decisis in ConstitutionalCases: ReconsideringNational League of
Cities, 2 CONST. COMMENTARY 123, 142 (1985) (comparing Justice Blackmun's role in National
League of Cities with Justice Roberts's role in West Coast Hotel); John E. Nowak, Resurrecting
Realist Jurisprudence: The PoliticalBiasofBurger CourtJustices, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 549, 583,
588 (1983) (same).
263. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
264. Frickey, supra note 262, at 143.
265. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 191-95

(1982).
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it, and offering elaborate and imaginative glosses that had undoubtedly
never occurred to the Court.2 66 It would appear in retrospect that those
efforts were largely, if not completely, wasted. Perhaps the case was, as
Philip Bobbitt has suggested, "not a major doctrinal turn but a cue to a
fellow constitutional actor, an incitement to Congress to renew its traditional role as protector of the states. '2 67 In any event, NationalLeague
of Cities certainly seems to qualify as the proverbial "restricted railroad
ticket, good for this day and train only. '26 8
For Justice Scalia, NationalLeague of Cities is not an aberration; it
is a paradigm. The day-to-day decisionmaking of the Supreme Court is
supported primarily by its bare institutional authority and only marginally by the limited intellectual authority the Court can claim on behalf of
its adjudication. Just as no particular stigma attaches to changing one's
mind when one never claimed to be "right" in the first place, there is no
particular intellectual stigma attached to overruling routine decisions,
because they had no real claim on our intellect to begin with. Thus,
when a shift of voting power on the Court materializes, the opportunity
to grab more power should, as Justice Scalia enthusiastically counsels,
"be seized at once" 269 before it slips through the judicial fingers. Recent
decisions may be overruled at will, especially when there is a change in
the Court's composition. And in fact, not long after the departure of
Justice Brennan-and with the help (and vote) of his replacement, Justice Souter-both Booth and Gathers were unceremoniously overruled at
the end of the Court's most recent Term. 2 70 Chief Justice Rehnquist explained in his majority opinion that both of the overruled precedents had
been five-to-four decisions, that "spirited dissents" had accompanied
them both, and that in any event the Court had overruled thirty-three of
its own decisions in the previous twenty years.27 1 As Plato has
Thrasymachus say, "justice is nothing other than the advantage of the
stronger";27 2 or, as Justice Scalia has a "cynic" say, "with five votes any' 273
thing is possible.
266. See, eg., Frank I. Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutationsof "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1166 (1977); Lawrence H. Tribe,
Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism andAffirmative Rights to EssentialGov-

ernment Services, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1066 (1977).
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

BOBBIrr, supra note 265, at 194.
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Gathers, 490 U.S. at 824 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Payne v. Tennessee, II S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
See id. at 2610-11.
PLATO, REPUBLIC 338c (Allan Bloom trans., 1968).

273. Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1175, 1185 (1989)
(quoting a "cynic").
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Nevertheless, exception must be made for "decisions that have become so embedded in our system of government that return is no longer
possible." 274 In these exceptional cases, the opportunity to overrule
them and grab more power has, for whatever reasons, been declined or
unavailable for so long that they have acquired, by a kind of adverse
possession, "the respect to which long-established practice is entitled." 275
Yet, this respect does not necessarily accrue to decisions on the ground
that they are "right" or because they are made by an intellectually authoritative institution. It may just as readily be explained by factors
wholly external to the Court, such as the fact that we have relied on these
decisions and ordered our affairs around them for lo these many years;
overruling them now would cause the most dislocation. Thus, if Marbury v. Madison had been decided recently, the Court would not hesitate
to overrule it at will. It is only Marbury's historical pedigree and presthe fact
tige that make it resistant to overruling this late in the day-not
276
that it was decided on true or correct reasoning or principles.
Justice Scalia's analysis provides the legal and policy rationales for
"head counting" and the relaxed hold of precedent; his denial of intellectual authority to the Court's decisions effectively implies the reduction of
its authority to institutional authority alone. Justice Scalia's views thus
confirm my suggestion that the only real authority for the Court's decisions emerges incidentally, through accommodation and acquiescence,
and because it was a "court of last resort" that made the decisions, not
because they were necessarily "right" or intellectually sound in the first
place.
It might be argued that the "great" opinions operate like primary
sources, and create ripple effects of increasing intellectual authority. But,
2 77
to test this, what would one say about a case like Plessy v. Ferguson?
It was a "landmark" case for almost sixty years, so it certainly had full
institutional authority, but did it have "intellectual authority"? In my
discussion of that concept I agreed that "survival is the test of greatness," ' 2 73 but by "survival" I did not mean bare persistence enforced by
power; I meant continued acceptance in the free marketplace of ideas.
Was the "Plessy doctrine" accepted as a result of intellectual debate? In
fact, the authority of Plessy steadily declined; it did not "survive," even
in the limited sense of retaining institutional authority. And then when it
274. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 825 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

275. Ia at 824.
276. At his confirmation hearings Justice Scalia seemed to acknowledge, however grudgingly,
that Marbury is for this reason probably safe from being overruled. See Scalia Hearings,supra note

187, at 104.
277. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
278. See supra text accompanying notes 121-27.
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was replaced by Brown v. Board of Education,279 did that mean that

Brown had more intellectual authority?
Actually, Brown is perhaps even better explained against the back-

ground of a momentous social transformation, coupled with some fortuitous

personnel

changes

and

some

extraordinary,

scenes.280

non-judicial

machinations behind the
In other words, Plessy did not owe its
ascendancy to its intellectual content, and its decline was not due to its
lack of intellectual content either.

Indeed, many of the great,

"landmark" cases-e.g., Brown, Roe v. Wade 281 -have been criticized as
devoid of rational argument or true intellectual authority.2 82
The consistent practices of the Presidency, the Senate, and the

Supreme Court cannot all be "wrong"-at least not over long periods of
time-because these practices eventually take on a normative signifi-

83
cance. Historical institutions become defined by what they have been.2

These considerations force one to reconsider the received view of the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, as a kind of intellectual
meritocracy where logic and rational argumentation are the coin of the
realm. That view is demonstrably unrealistic and sharply at variance

with the institutional setting and contemporary practice of adjudication;
it must finally be given up.
IV.

STYLES OF LEGAL THEORIZING

[J]udges and scholars have ... gone off in search of help from strange
and alien gods.... A wave of continental learning swept over England,
leaving a thick deposit of its obscurant abstractions, and much of it
still remains.
284
-Herman Oliphant
279. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
280. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976); Philip Elman & Norman Silber, The Solicitor General's Off ce, Justice Frankfurter,and Civil Rights Litigation 1946-1960: An Oral History,
100 HARV. L. REv. 817 (1987). But see Randall Kennedy, A Reply to Philip Elman, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1938 (1987) (contending that Elman's account of the Brown litigation is inaccurate and misleading). See also Philip Elman, Response, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1949 (1987) (defending his
memoirs).

281. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
282. On Plessy, see Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 748-50,
752, 755-56 (1982) (making clear that Plessy's authority is merely institutional); on Brown, see
Wechsler, supra note 236; on Roe, see John H. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe
v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
283. As Hegel more elegantly put it in German, "Wesen ist was gewesen ist." ("Essence is what
has been."), quoted in JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 120 (Hazel E. Barnes trans.,
1956). See HEGEL'S LOGiC 163 (William Wallace trans., 3d ed. 1975); 2 GEORG W.F. HEGEL,
WISSENSCHAFT DER LoGIK 3 (Georg Lasson ed., 1934).
284. Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 74 (1928).
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In this Part, I consider some prominent examples of contemporary
legal scholarship in light of the analysis developed in this Article.
A.

Drama at the High Court

Robert Weisberg's DeregulatingDeath 28 5 is an excellent example of
the new legal scholarship and of what may be termed the "dramatic"
approach to judicial decisionmaking. Weisberg brings to his subject the
heightened literary sensibilities that one would expect of a former professor of English literature. And indeed his subject is perhaps the most
inherently dramatic in the entire legal repertoire: capital punishment.
DeregulatingDeath is an elaborate study-part doctrinal history,
part documentary history, part rhetorical analysis, 28 6 and part philo7 -of the modem Supreme Court's efforts to consophical speculation 2ST
tain capital punishment within the rule of law. Weisberg focuses on the
penalty phase, as opposed to the guilt phase, of capital murder trials.
Since Furman v. Georgia,28 8 which (whatever else it did) condemned the
"arbitrary" or "standardless" imposition of the death penalty, the
Supreme Court has increasingly required state courts and legislatures to
28 9
invest the so-called "penalty trial" with greater formal rationality.
But in an abrupt about-face at the end of the 1982 Term, the Court
seemed to have despaired of carrying out its decade-long enterprise. It
apparently decided to "deregulate" the penalty trial and essentially let
the states decide what substantive and procedural protections-beyond a
290
bare minimum-to provide.
As Weisberg sees it, the legal history of death penalty doctrine
traces out a grand intellectual struggle between a "romantic" and a
"classical" view of law. Prior to Furman, Justice Harlan had warned:
"To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides
and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express
these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond
285. Weisberg, supra note 238.
286. See, ag., id. at 310 (discussing "tone" of McGautha opinion); i. at 319 (discussing the
"rhetoric of lament and exhortation" of Furman and the "rhetoric of subtle observation and ap[i]n the manner of literary criticism,"
proval" of Gregg); id.at 317 (extracting "unifying 'themes,'....
from Furman);id.at 339 ("I am less concerned with specific issues than with the doctrinal rhetoric
the courts have used."); id. at 342-43 (analyzing "metaphor" of the trial and "[tihe rhetoric of
defense argument"); id. at 355 ("The Barclay case is as much a literary as a legal
phenomenon .... ).
287. See id. at 383-95.
288. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
289. See, ag., Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
290. See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
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present human ability."' 29 1 The "romantics" set out, with "good old
American know-how," to prove Justice Harlan wrong.2 92 They relied on
a separate penalty trial, rigorous appellate review to guard against inequality among sentences, and "a disciplined rational procedure to guide
the sentencer in examining evidence . . .and applying it to a logical
choice of sentence. '293 Presumably Weisberg terms this view "romantic" because it reflects an almost naive or sentimental faith in the power
of formal legal rules to guide and limit discretion. More generally, it
suggests an unreconstructed optimism that basic social and political
problems can be solved by the progressive refinement of legal doctrine.
The competing "classical" account of capital punishment offers a
more mature, austere legal vision. It frankly acknowledges the practical
limits and administrative costs of judicial doctrine-building, 294 stresses
the inapplicability of the trial metaphor at the sentencing phase, 295 and
patiently explains the logical irreconcilability of horizontal equity and
individualized sentencing.2 96 In the companion case to McGautha, for
example, "Harlan seems perfectly willing to concede that Crampton's dilemma was unfair and even 'cruel.' But he insists that a bit of reflection
shows that all trials are in some ways unfair. The tone of the opinion is
that life generally is unfair, and the law need be no fairer. '2 97 Philosophical skepticism and a certain "wizened pessimism" (if not cynicism)
about death penalty doctrine-making are thus hallmarks of the classical
298
view.
Weisberg's perspective on individual Justices and their legal opinions is an extraordinarily broad one. In his account, the Justices loom

larger than life-larger than mere judges, certainly, and a fortiori larger
than mere mortals. From this commanding height they represent and
embody definite philosophical positions and attempt to implement
sweeping-often extra-legal-philosophical agendas. Justice Harlan, for
example, "does not simply rely on the conventional tools of precedent
and analogy. He seems also to want to write a Burkean essay condemn-

ing the due process argument as romantic utopianism, a failure to
achieve tragic wisdom. ' 299 And Justice Douglas's opinion in Furman "is
291. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971).
292. Weisberg, supra note 238, at 318.
293. Id at 319.
294. See id.at 307, 322, 346, 352-53.
295. See id. at 342, 346, 349-52.
296. See id. at 323-24, 327.
297. Id. at 310 (footnote omitted).
298. See id at 314.
299. Id. at 310; see also id. at 309 ("[TheMcGautha opinion is now due for a bit of restorative
interpretation, having proved partly prophetic in its technical holding, and generally prophetic in its
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not so much a legal opinion as a cultural document, an emotive internal
monologue of American political liberalism engaged publicly in moral
self-criticism during the middle of the Vietnam era. It is a catalog of
''3°°
cultural embarrassments, not an analysis of legal error.
When the Justices square off against each other, moreover, it is a
battle of intellectual titans we are observing, a struggle over immortal
philosophical principles, not simply the petty, personal quarrels of mere
judges over disputed points of law. In the McGautha opinions, for
example:
Harlan's posture of Burkean skepticism is even more apparent in the
second holding-that standardless jury sentencing does not violate due
process. On that issue, Justice Brennan provides the perfect antagonist
in the role of pedantic idealist-the Tom Paine to Harlan's Burke-so
3 01
that the two can conduct a rhetorical debate on legal philosophy.
And in Zant v. Stephens:
Rehnquist is discovering and asserting Justice Powell's view in Bullington: The penalty trial is an existential moment of moral perception,
neither right nor wrong, and therefore largely unreviewable.
Justice Marshall's dissent in Zant is full of the outrage of one who
has been cheated and lied to. He speaks in disbelief.., as one who has
accepted the romantic due process account and now30is2 bewildered as
the Court reads it out of its own historical memory.
Similarly, in Barclay v. Florida:
[Justice Rehnquist] makes a few specific legal points, but the opinion
reads mostly like a laconic expression of annoyance that anyone could
seriously imagine the Court's being concerned with violations of the
procedural niceties of Florida law....
Justice Stevens expresses distress over Rehnquist's repeated casual
nihilism. But the disagreement is again one of attitude rather than of
if
law.... Ultimately, Stevens, like Rehnquist, relies on the strong
303
Delphic authority of Zant to declare Barclay's claims worthless.
Weisberg's study may be termed a "first-order" account in that his
descriptions, though creative, probably do roughly approximate the Justices' and the Court's own self-understanding. The Justices probably do,
in some sense, think of themselves as leading actors in an epic legal
skeptical philosophy."); id at 311 (discussing Justice Harlan's "broader philosophical agenda"); id.
at 312 ("[Mlore broadly, Harlan's opinion is an essay on the inevitable limits of legal doctrinemaking and the pretenses of legal language."); id at 347 (Justice Stevens "takes on a far bigger
matter than the case originally seemed to raise. He has to revoke the romantic due process view of
the penalty phase as a criminal trial.").
300. Id. at 316.
301. Id. at 311. In a footnote to this passage Weisberg asks the reader to compare Paine's The
Rights of Man to Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France. See id. at 311 n.25.

302. Id. at 353 (footnotes omitted).
303. Id. at 357 (footnotes omitted).
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drama (or as intellectual titans debating immortal philosophical principles). In Weisberg's "creative redescription," that is, the Justices would
probably recognize themselves and what they have been doing and saying. Regardless of whether Justices do think of themselves in this way,
however, the question still remains: Is it useful for us to think of them
this way? As I have suggested throughout this Article, an uncritical
adoption of the judiciary's own self-understanding cannot ordinarily be
justified on the assumptions that prevail in a normal humanistic discipline, i.e., the assumption that the objects of its study and research are
original texts and primary sources that deserve or have otherwise earned
a degree of intellectual authority that warrants the extended intellectual
attention that is lavished upon them. Weisberg's "dramatic" perspective
involves such an assumption, although perhaps only in the most general
sense.
The accounts to which I shall now turn, however, may be termed
"second-order" accounts, because they impose more or less external paradigms upon what would be a more or less uncomprehending Court.
These accounts. go at least one step beyond the Court's own self-understanding; the Justices would probably not recognize themselves, or what
they have been doing and saying, in these descriptions.
Frank Michelman, for example, offers a "version" of Supreme Court
adjudication that is "largely an interpretation of the profound and extensive writings of one eminent historian of the republican tradition ...
leavened by some reading [of another]."1304 It seems safe to assume that
the Justices would not recognize themselves in Michelman's "version" of
them, and it is probable that many others would not either. For
Michelman, a case about an Orthodox Jew who wished to wear a yarmulke while on active duty in the Air Force involves, simultaneously,
"themes of dialogue: conversation, inclusion, and recognition; themes of
history: narration and continuation; themes of responsibility: contextuality and immediacy; and themes of identity: shared humanity (including difference) and common good (including confrontation with
difference)." 30 5 "Together," says Michelman, "these themes compose a
loose unity of their own.... Happily for us, their conjunction is strikingly exemplified in Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Goldman v.
Weinberger. ' 30 6 In that opinion, Justice O'Connor adopts a balancing
test:
First, because the government is attempting to override an interest specifically protected by the Bill of Rights, the government must show
304. Michelman, supra note 6, at 36 n.175.

305. Id. at 33.
306. Id. (emphasis added).
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that the opposing interest it asserts is of especial importance before
there is any chance that its claim can prevail. Second, since the Bill of
Rights is expressly designed to protect the individual against the aggregated and sometimes intolerant powers of the state, the government
must show that the interest asserted will in fact be substantially
harmed by30 7 granting the type of exemption requested by the
individual.

Michelman asserts that adopting this balancing test is "a significant act
of commitment on Justice O'Connor's part," and that in so doing she
"displays both its reconciliatory spirit and its dialogic force. ' 30 8 For
those who missed these aspects of Justice O'Connor's balancing test, it is
necessary to go through Michelman's analysis in more detail:
Justice O'Connor's particular choice of a test commits her ... to a

particular version of national normative history and, through it, of national normative identity. As narrator resuming in medias res a story
of many threads-"this Court's precedents"-it is she who decides
which threads to pick up, where, in what combination. The subplot
she chooses is that of the social conflict of religion and regulation. To
see the commitment in that choice, one need only compare it with Justice Rehnquist's for the Court. His subplot-no less fairly available
than hers in the history-is that of separation of powers, of the articulation of government into agencies related by status. These narrative
choices express world views: in her subplot, the setting is society, the
protagonists are troubled persons, and the agon is social difference. In
are abstract authorities,
his, the setting is the state, the protagonists
30 9
and the agon is institutional deference.
It is probably safe to assume that neither Justice O'Connor nor Justice
Rehnquist knew what an "agon" is, much less suspected that their
"world views" included one, and even less dreamed, in their wildest
dreams, that their disposition of the Goldman case could possibly turn on
such a strange and obscure Greek word. For the uninitiated, Miechelman
patiently explains that "[a] drama's 'agon' is its central field or argument
of struggle. The Greek word literally describes an assemblage of people
at a field of contest, perhaps initially and primarily an athletic field or
race course."' 310 And if Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist-those law
3 11
school classmates, fellow law review editors, and long-time friends -

307. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 530 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
308. Miechelman, supra note 6, at 34.
309. Id. at 35 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
310. Id. at 35 n.172.
311. See WILLIAM REHNQUIsT, THE SUPREME COURT (1987): "Sandra and I were classmates
in law school, and my wife, Nan, and her husband, John, were undergraduate classmates there. We
go back a long time, and I was overjoyed at her appointment to the Supreme Court." Id. at 258-59.
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indeed have incompatible "world views," we presumably owe that discovery to Professor Michelman as well. As Michelman himself concedes, "[t]his sounds like a pathology of court-fetishism, and it may be
that." 312
B. A Map of JudicialMisreading
David Cole's Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First
Amendment Tradition3 13 is one of the most elaborate "second-order" accounts of the judicial process that draws explicitly on a specific non-legal
theory. Cole "appl[ies Harold Bloom's] critical model for reading poetry
to Supreme Court adjudication. ' 3 14 To do justice to Cole's project it will
be necessary to explicate Bloom's theory first.
1. Bloom's Theory of Poetic Influence. In The Anxiety of Influence, 3 15 A Map of Misreading,3 16 and several later works, 3 17 Harold
Bloom charts a perilous course between the idealized formalism of the
1950s New Critics and the despiritualized structuralism of the 1980s
deconstructionists. I can think of no better way to present Bloom's theory than to explicate three key terms from his main titles: influence,
anxiety, and misreading.
"Influence" is in a sense the central concept, and it can be explored
at several levels. Bloom insists from the very beginning that the writerand in particular the poet-must always be situated within the rich, overlapping contexts of language, thought, history, tradition, and literary culture. To this extent Bloom's theory is "relational" (or contextual); like
Hegel, he defines things in terms of what they are not, in terms of what
distinguishes them from other things.
And how do poets distinguish themselves? One is tempted to say
that "they write new, original, intensely creative poems"; yet upon closer
examination this proposition becomes problematic. Even when poets
defy the conventions of poetry they are still writing in reference to (in
"negative reference," perhaps) those conventions; even when poets use
312. Michelman, supra note 6, at 74.
313. David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the FirstAmendment Tradition, 95
YALE L.J. 857 (1986).

314. Id at 858.
315. BLOOM, supra note 7.
316. BLOOM, supra note 67.
317. See HAROLD BLOOM, AGON: TOWARDS A THEORY OF REVISIONISM (1982) [hereinafter
BLOOM, AGON]; HAROLD BLOOM, THE BREAKING OF THE VESSELS (1982); HAROLD BLOOM, POETRY AND REPRESSION: REVISIONISM FROM BLAKE TO STEVENS (1976) [hereinafter BLOOM, POETRY AND REPRESSION].
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language in new and unusual ways they are still using language (and lin318
guistic and literary conventions).
One may grant that all poets are in some sense trying to be different;
they "differentiate themselves into strength," says Bloom, by "turning
from the presence of other poets. ' 319 It is necessary to avoid the influence of previous poems in order to write a truly new one. In this sense,
what a poem is essentially "about" is otherpoems-they are conspicuous
by their absence. 320 "Precursor" poets and their poems loom so large,
and cast such a profound and ominous pall over the creative world of
later poets, that the hapless efforts of these "latecomers" to be original

amount mainly to perpetual (and largely unsuccessful) efforts to avoid
321

being influenced.
Bloom's second key concept is "anxiety." The "anxiety of influence" is the fear that there may be nothing new left to say, that the great
thoughts have already been thought and the great poems already written. 322 The great poets of the past are overwhelming-they are too powerful, too influential, and too all-consuming to be faced directly and
acknowledged fully. 323 "The precursors flood us, and our imaginations

can die by drowning in them ...

"324

What do later poets do when faced with this potentially overwhelming influence of the great dead poets? They do what we all do in such a
situation: They put up defenses, and they evade the full force of the onslaught by turning aside. Defenses and evasion are necessary because "if
any poet knows too well what causes his poem, then he cannot write it,
318. See BLOOM, supra note 7, at 25 ("[I]ntensification and... self-realization alike are accomplished only through language, and no poet since Adam and Satan speaks a language free of the one
wrought by his precursors."); BLOOM, THE BREAKING OF THE VESSELS, supra note 317, at 61
("Poems... are verbal utterances that cannot be regarded as being simply linguistic entities, because
they manifest their will to utter within traditions of uttering."). The poets might well interrupt at
this point to assert that, even if they are in some sense "captives" of linguistic and literary conventions, they still have some original ideas, or some unique feelings to express about the "subjects" of
their poems. Bloom carries his argument further by denying even this; in so doing he develops
perhaps the most forceful theory of literary tradition ever articulated.
319. BLOOM, supra note 67, at 80.
320. See id. at 31 ("To do just the opposite is also a form of imitation, and the definition of
imitation ought by rights to include both." (quotation omitted)).
321. See BLOOM, supra note 7, at 139 ("[TIhe strong dead return, in poems as in our lives, and
they do not come back without darkening the living.").
322. See id. at 148 ("[T]he covert subject of most poetry for the last three centuries has been the
anxiety of influence, each poet's fear that no proper work remains for him to perform.").
323. See iL at 27 ("They engross our attention, and so prevent a due inspection of ourselves;
they prejudice our judgment in favor of their abilities, and so lessen the sense of our own; and they
intimidate us with this splendor of their renown.").
324. Id. at 154; see also BLOOM, supra note 67, at 52 ("Our poets' characteristic anxiety is not so
much an expectation of being flooded by poetic ancestors, as already having been flooded before one
could even begin.").
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or at least will write it badly. He must repress the causes, including the
precursor-poems .... ,,325
Bloom captures this process of defense and evasion with the concept
of "misreading," the basic paradigm for which is Freud's so-called "family romance. '326 "To live, the poet must misinterpretth6 father .... -"327
For Virgil the overwhelming precursor is Homer, for Wordsworth it is
Milton, for Wallace Stevens it is Whitman, and so on. In every case,
later poets make literary history only by "misreading" their poetic forefathers, "so as to clear imaginative space for themselves. ' 328
Bloom has developed a detailed "map of misreading" that can only
be hinted at here. In a legal context, three aspects of the process of misreading are of particular significance: It is willful and pragmatic; it is
personal and subjective; and it is falsification. These aspects all have important implications for the theory of legal interpretation that Cole develops on the basis of Bloom's ideas.
The poet's need to misinterpret a dominant predecessor arises out of
anxieties about originality, autonomy, and ultimately identity. "We read
to usurp, just as the poet writes to usurp," says Bloom. "Usurp what?
*.. A place, a stance, a fullness, an illusion of identification or possession;

something we can call our own or even ourselves. '3 29 Partly deliberately, partly unconsciously, the poet comes to realize that the influence of
the precursor must be resisted at all costs-at least if any worthwhile
new poetry is to be possible. This realization is not a cognitive judgment
that the predecessor is "unworthy" of respect or admiration; quite to the
contrary, the predecessor is all too worthy. Misreading is simply a willful, pragmatic refusal to follow in an illustrious predecessor's more than
ample footsteps. For the true poet, even striking out in a "wrong," but
new, direction may be preferable to merely following another.
325. BLOOM, POETRY AND REPRESSION, supra note 317, at 5.

326. See SIGMUND FREUD, MOSES AND MONOTHEISM 9-13 (Katherine Jones trans., 1949); see
also BLOOM, supra note 7, at 56-57 ("[TIhe anxiety of influence, from which we all suffer, whether

we are poets or not, has to be located first in its origins, in the fateful morasses of what Freud, with
grandly desperate wit, called 'the family romance.' ").
327. BLOOM, supra note 67, at 19; see also BLOOM, supra note 7:
[A] poet's stance, his Word, his imaginative identity, his whole being, must be unique to
him, and remain unique, or he will perish, as a poet, if ever even he has managed his rebirth into poetic incarnation. But this fundamental stance is as much also his precursor's
as any man's fundamental nature is also his father's, however transformed, however turned
about.
Id. at 71.
328. BLOOM, supra note 7, at 5.
329. BLOOM, AGON, supra note 317, at 17; see also BLOOM, supra note 7, at 65 ("[T"he poet, in
writing his poem, is forced to see the assertion against influence as being a rituaized quest for

identity.").
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For these reasons Bloom terms the process of misreading "per330
verse," in the root sense of "swerving" from a pre-established path.
The latecomer poet's decision that "the great masterpieces of anterior art
must be destroyed, if any great works are still to be performed" 331 has
little to do with judgment, knowledge, and truth-seeking. It is, rather, an
assertion of power that answers to practical, pragmatic, and emotional
needs.3 32 Instead of asking "Am I getting this poem [or text] right?" the
strong misreader asks "[W]hat is it good for, what can I do with it, what
can it do for me, what can I make it mean?" 333 Misreading the precursor
is for Bloom "willing error, '3 34 "falsification," 3 35 "a lie against the truth
of time. ' 336 The poet's (and critic's) agenda is "personal, agonistic and
original, ' ' a37 so "[flacts and arguments alike have little to do with" it.338
In this context, the only real requirement of a good reading is that it be
strong.339 "For [poets], to be judicious is to be weak," says Bloom, "and
to compare, exactly and fairly, is to be not elect. ' ' 34° Indeed, Bloom approvingly cites Oscar Wilde's warning that "the critical imagination
'3 41
[must] never fall into careless habits of accuracy."
Complaints that Bloom's theory of poetic influence is itself "perverse" are, in a sense, beside the point. One must constantly keep in
mind that different criteria of evaluation apply in different intellectual
contexts. Bloom's elaboration of this theme provides a useful summary
of his work:
Criticism is not a science, not even a "human science," and it is not a
branch of philosophy. The theory of poetry need not meet the tests by
330. See BLOOM, supra note 7, at 14 ("A poet swerves away from his precursor . . . . This
appears as a corrective movement in his own poem, which implies that the precursor poem went
accurately up to a certain point, but then should have swerved, precisely in the direction that the

new poem moves.").
331. BLOOM, POETRY AND REPRESSION, supra note 317, at 4.

332. See BLOOM, supra note 7, at 29 ("You have only to think of the strong emotional factors
that make it hard for many people to fit themselves in with others or to subordinate themselves.");
see also BLOOM, supra note 67, at 69-70 (viewing Nietzsche's "will to power" as "a paradigm for our
understanding of intra-textual encounters").
333. BLOOM, AGoN, supra note 317, at 19.
334. BLOOM, supra note 67, at 93.
335. Id. at 69.
336. BLOOM, supra note 7, at 130; see also BLOOM, AGON, supra note 317, at 41 ("[P]oetry and
criticism... are closer to lies and self-deceptions than to any other fictions. If we ever get a vigorous
philosophy of the lie, then we may be close to a useful philosophy of poetry.").
337. BLOOM, THE BREAKING OF THE VESSELs, supra note 317, at 37.
338. Id. at 26.

339. See id. at 25 ("with the strength of usurpation, of persistence, of eloquence").
340. BLOOM, supra note 7, at 19.
341. BLOOM, AGON, supra note 317, at 18 ("We must see the object, the poem, as in itself it
really is not, because we must see not only what is missing in it, but why the poem had to exclude

what is missing.").
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which science and philosophy rate theory, or by which they decide
what is or is not theory. The theory of poetry, like all criticism, is an
art, a teachable and useful art, and its true criteria are poetic: it must
be memorable, pragmatic where it is most visionary, and it must give
pleasure, even if only to an elite....

By these criteria, most current

theory can be given back to the empirical342
scientists, to the social scientists, and to the dialectical philosophers.
2. Judgesas Poets. As noted above, David Cole has developed an
ambitious and imaginative application of Bloom's theories to Supreme
Court adjudication. 343 The first sentence of Cole's article, however, is a
concession: "Supreme Court Justices are not often mistaken for
poets. '344 That observation seems almost to serve as a challenge for
Cole-he proceeds to build his remarkable piece of misreading on the
premise that Supreme Court Justices are very much like poets. Cole's
thesis, in a nutshell, is that the Justices experience the "anxiety of influence" when confronted with the texts of their great legal precursors; consequently, their opinions are "misreadings" (in Bloom's sense) of those
predecessors.
As Cole readily acknowledges, "seemingly fundamental" rationales
underlie our expectation that the law will be ordered, principled, and
predictable. 345 Unlike the poet, who is presumptively free to create ideas
out of thin air, the judge is expected to adhere to established rules and
principles in construing and applying the law. "Indeed, the very legitimacy of judicial review seems to rest on the difference. '34 6 Here, obviously, "legitimacy" is the key term: Adjudication derives legitimacy, and
thereby authority, from its apparent fidelity to original texts (e.g., constitutions, statutes, regulations) and its adherence to precedent. A quick
look at representative lawyers and poets makes the point well. Here is
Blackstone on precedent:
[I]t is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where the
same points come again in litigation: as well to keep the scale ofjustice
even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge's opinion; as also because the law in that case being solemnly declared and
determined, what before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now
become a permanent rule, which it is not in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from, according to his private sentiments:
342. BLOOM, THE BREAKING OF THE VESSELS, supra note 317, at 25-26.

343. Cole, supra note 313.
344. Id. at 858.
345. See id.

346. Id.; see also id. at 867 ("A legal order that was subject only to the whim and caprice of a
few men in black robes who considered themselves divinely inspired would be little more than des-

potism; its legitimacy would likely rest on the threat of physical force rather than on the consent of
the people.").

Vol. 41:191]

HUMANISTIC THEORY IN LAW

he being sworn to determine, not according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land
347

And here is Emerson on self-reliance:
To believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for you in
your private heart, is true for all men,-that is genius. Speak your
latent conviction and it shall be the universal sense .... Familiar as

the voice of the mind is to each, the highest merit we ascribe to Moses,
Plato, and Milton, is that they set at naught books and traditions, and
spoke not what men but what they thought .... They teach us to abide

by our spontaneous impression with good-humored inflexibility
then
348
most when the whole cry of voices is on the other side.
Cole nevertheless advances two reasons for treating Supreme Court
Justices and poets alike: (1) Poets are not as "creative" as is commonly
assumed; and (2) the Justices are more creative than is commonly assumed.349 As for the poets, their apparently creative acts are always
breaks from a past tradition and are defined and understood in terms of
their relation to that tradition.35 0 This is basically the Bloomian theory,
as described above. 3 51 As for the Justices, Cole observes that they inevitably engage in some degree of interpretation, because legal texts and
precedents do not otherwise yield any meaning. 352 "Supreme Court Justices are creative ... insofar as the situations they face demand that a
standing body of law be consistently reinterpreted and tailored to novel
facts. ' 353 This is essentially the modem theory of meaning, as applied to
legal method.
The picture that emerges is of a continuum. At one end are the
poets; at the other end are those Justices who simply follow precedent.
3 54
These Justices find legitimacy "in a kind of plodding belatedness."
Toward the middle are the "great" Justices who break sharply and creatively from precedent and tradition. Their greatness consists precisely
in having abandoned mere legitimacy in favor of strong, constructive
"misreadings" of important legal predecessors. "[A]s in poetry, those
who ultimately succeed in the struggle and are viewed as great are not
347. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 132, at 69.
348. RALPH W. EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF RALPH WALDO

EMERSON 27 (Joseph Slater et al. eds., 1979).
349. See Cole, supra note 313, at 858.
350. See iL
351. See supra text accompanying notes 315-42.
352. See Cole, supra note 313, at 858. Some rather unremarkable consequences follow: "[T]he
meaning of a text is... always open to question.... A particular precedent may therefore appear to
support several interpretations .... Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 866.
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those who follow precedent, but those who break radically from tradition
by acts of 'misreading.' ",355
According to Cole, the great "poets" of First Amendment law (the
area he treats) are Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Brennan.3 56 One
might remark, in Bloom's terms, that they indeed share a certain "blindness towards the canonical authorities they sought to invert or subvert. ' 357 But in Holmes's case, according to Cole, the "canonical
authority" is Holmes's own opinion for the Court in Schenck v. United
358
States.
Schenck was convicted under the Espionage Act of 1917 for supervising the printing of an anti-war circular that exhorted: "[M]aintain,
' 359
support and uphold" the "right to assert your opposition to the draft.
In affirming Schenck's conviction, Holmes's opinion for a unanimous
Court disposed of the free speech issue in a single paragraph, which included the so-called "clear and present danger" test:
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in
saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their
constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the
circumstances in which it is done.... The question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such
a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent. It is a
36°
question of proximity and degree.
Eight months later, the Court was presented with the similar case of
Abrams v. United States,36 1 which involved the distribution of leaflets
encouraging resistance to the United States and calling for a general
strike in time of war. 362 A majority of the Court dismissed the petitioner's First Amendment claims summarily, as "definitely negatived" by
Schenck. 363 This time, however, Holmes (joined by Brandeis) dissented,
and in so doing he penned a ringing endorsement of First Amendment
principles that hardly seems to have been written by the author of
Schenck:
In this case sentences of twenty years imprisonment have been imposed for the publishing of two leaflets that I believe the defendants
355.
356.
explicit
357.
358.
359.
360.
- 361.
362.
363.

Id. at 859.
See id at 866. Cole states that "nearly every free speech case since 1927 involves either an
or implicit misreading of [Holmes's and Brandeis's] theories." Id. at 892.
BLoOM, supra note 67, at 62.
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
Id at 51.
Id. at 52.
250 U.S. 616 (1919).
See id at 617.
See id. at 619.
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had as much right to publish as the Government has to publish the
Constitution of the United States now vainly invoked by them. Even if
I am technically wrong and enough can be squeezed from these poor
and puny anonymities to turn the color of legal litmus paper... the
most nominal punishment seems to me all that possibly could be infficted, unless the defendants are to be made to suffer not for what the
indictment alleges but for the creed that they avow ....
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly
logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and
want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your
wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. . . .I think that we
should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of
opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless
they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful
and pressing purposes
of the law that an immediate check is required
364
to save the country.

Cole explains this reversal as a classic manifestation of the "anxiety
of influence": "In Abrams, Holmes strongly misread not only binding
legal precedent, but precedent that he himself had very recently au-

thored. In thus dissenting from himself, Holmes battled an authority
more immediate and perhaps more powerful than any other precursor."'365 Yet the invocation of Bloom's theories does not seem to add any
special or additional explanatory power to Cole's discussion. He notes,
for example:
The lasting power of the Abrams dissent lies in its restatement of the
"clear and present" danger test ....Holmes revised the test he had
enunciated in Schenck by elaborating on the elements of proximity and
degree. The danger must be "immediate" and of virtually revolutionary proportions, so that "an immediate check is required to save the
country." The immediacy must also be tangible ... .366

A standard commentary, however, makes the same point just as well:
[I]n Abrams, Holmes infused into his restatement of "clear and present
danger" new elements that afforded greater protection for speech.
Most strikingly, he now maintained that the proximity of the danger
from speech must be "clear and imminent," not just "clear and present." He used variations of "immediate" and "imminent" with remarkable frequency throughout his dissent, and even appended
3 67
"forthwith" and "pressing" for additional emphasis.
364. Id. at 629-30 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
365. Cole, supra note 313, at 882-83.
366. Id. at 884 (footnote omitted).
367. David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern FirstAmendment Doctrine, 50 U. CIII. L.
REv. 1205, 1308 (1983) (footnote omitted); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 843 (2d ed. 1988) ("Justice Holmes' ... doctrinal approach was to infuse more immediacy into the Schenck formulation of the clear and present danger test and thereby sharply
distinguish it from the loose predictions of remote consequence which had been sufficient to sustain
criminal convictions in the previous cases.").
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Cole observes further that "[t]hese elaborations give concrete meaning to
the formal outlines of 'clear and present danger.' It seems probable that
had Holmes suggested these specific thresholds in his original formulation, he would not have enjoyed majority support, nor could he have
upheld Schenck's conviction. ' 368 Yet a standard casebook raises similar
concerns, without benefit of Bloom's theories:
Did the Abrams dissent simply apply the Schenck standard, or did it
give a new meaning to clear and present danger?...
... Does Abrams give new content to "clear and present danger"?

Can it be said that the Schenck phrase was not turned into an effective
369
safeguard of speech until the Abrams dissent?
Cole's final triumph is to explain Holmes's doctrinal transformation in
"antithetical" terms:
[Holmes's] elaboration in Abrams reads as if it is only a clarification,
rather than a revision, of the earlier test. Thus, he exploits the precedential weight of the Schenck formulation while infusing it with new
meaning by an antithetical reading. So revised, the clear and present
danger test had the potential to offer substantial protection for
370
speech.
Yet, again, other commentators have reached the same conclusions
(sometimes even formulated in the same words), albeit by more direct,
pedestrian routes:
With the advent of the Holmes eloquence in Abrams, Schenck is infused with new vitality and Debs is conveniently forgotten....
The strategy is... to read the burst of eloquence at the end of the
Abrams dissent into the casual Schenck dictum and then to claim that
it was there all the time, that it was this intense commitment to a stringent test for freedom of speech that the whole Court underwrote in
Schenck. And in a curious extra-precedential way it works. 37 1
The main premise of Cole's "antithetical" reading is that Holmes's
own eight-month old Schenck opinion created in him the "anxiety of
368. Cole, supra note 313, at 884-85.
369. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 986, 995 (1lth ed. 1985).
370. Cole, supra note 313, at 885 (emphasis added).
371. HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION 138, 146 (1988) (emphasis added); cf
TRIBE, supra note 367, at 843 (Holmes's approach was "to infuse more immediacy into the Schenck
formulation of the clear and present danger test.") (emphasis added); KALVEN, supra:
Drawing on his opinion for the Court in Schenck, [Holmes] seeks to capitalize on the
casual language about clear and present danger. Chafee sees in this a retrospective explanation of Schenck, and he joins with Holmes and Brandeis in an effort to alchemize clear
and present danger into the test, a test ratified by a unanimous Court.
Id. at 138; see also Yosal Rogat & James M. O'Fallon, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting OpinionThe Speech Cases, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1349, 1383 (1984) (In Abrams, Holmes "argued that his clear
and present danger dictum in Schenck should be taken seriously and promoted to a legal
principle.").
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influence. ' '372 But it is highly questionable whether a Bloomian analysis
even applies in this situation, where the misreader and the misread would
be identical. 373 In any event, much simpler and more plausible explanations of Holmes's transformation readily suggest themselves:
Holmes's concluding paragraph in his Abrams dissent ...suggests that he himself recognized the vast change in his views on free
speech during the eight months since he wrote Schenck, Frohwerk, and
Debs .... The text ...seems as much a confession of personal conversion as a statement of constitutional law. Holmes, perhaps unselfconsciously, appears to be commenting on himself and those of his
contemporaries
who came to a belated appreciation of the value of free
374
speech.
In effect, the great Justice changed his mind, as all people do from time
to time.375 The law, however, is not supposed to change (at least not that
much, that fast). So Holmes did what judges typically do when faced
with "a conviction so clearly wrong" 376 as to require a departure from
past precedents. He distinguished the new case from the old, by "investing [the] facts with a tone helpful to his result" 377-and insisted all the
while that the old cases had been correctly decided and that the new
decision represented not the slightest departure from them. 378 The whole
episode is easily understood as an example of standard judicial technique

372. See Cole, supra note 313, at 882-83.
373. See supra text accompanying notes 365-71.
374. Rabban, supra note 367, at 1309-10.
375. For discussions of the various considerations that may have been on Holmes's mind (none
of which involved the "anxiety of influence"), see id at 1311-17; Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand
and the Origins of Modern FirstAmendment Doctrine" Some Fragmentsof History, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 719 (1975).
376. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 86 (1941); see also
KALVEN, supra note 371, at 146 ("Justice Holmes's splendid indignation over the shabby draconian
treatment of the radicals in Abrams, whom he saw as distributors of 'these poor and puny anonymities,' supplies a blood transfusion for the Schenck dictum.").
377. G. Edward White, Looking at Holmes in the Mirror,4 LAw & HIST. REv. 439, 458 (1986);
see also Rogat & O'FalIon, supra note 371, at 1387-89.
378. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I never
have seen any reason to doubt that the questions of law that alone were before this Court in the cases
of Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs ...were rightly decided.") (citations omitted); TRIBE, supra note
367, at 843 ("Holmes' dissent in Abrams is marred by ambiguity and by his insistence [that]
Schenck, Frohwerk, and especially Debs had been rightly decided. One cynical interpretation of
Holmes' handiwork might be that speech is protected only as long as it is ineffective.") (footnotes
omitted).
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in a case law regime. 37 9 One has to look much farther afield to see the
"anxiety of influence" at work here.380
3.

Judges as Philosophers. Philosophy is another prime discipline

to scavenge for non-legal sources of legal theory, and there is no shortage
of attempts to view judges and Justices as if they were philosophers. 3 81 A
recent article on City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co. 382 by Michel Rosenfeld is a good example of this phenomenon. 383 Rosenfeld has a definite philosophical theory in mind, and the Justices generally fail to
measure up to it.

After criticizing process-based constitutional theories, Rosenfeld
states that "a principled assessment of the constitutionality of affirmative
379. See, eg., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (eliminating
common law rules that had favored landlords); Tedla v. Ellman, 19 N.E.2d 987 (N.Y. 1939) (eliminating the common law principle that a plaintiff who violates a statute designed to prevent the harm
sustained is barred from recovery).
380. For discussions of how common this sort of "misreading" is (although usually without
being called precisely that), see Paul Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original Understanding,
60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 228-34 (1980); Harry W. Jones, Precedentand Policy in ConstitutionalLaw, 4
PACE L. REv. 11, 12-14 (1983); Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalAdjudication,
88 COLUM. L. REv. 723, 770-72 (1988); Weisberg, supra note 238, at 313-14.
381. See eg., Drucilla L. Cornell, InstitutionalizationofMeaning, Recollective Imaginationand
the PotentialforTransformative Legal Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1135 (1988) (analyzing
legal interpretation from a social philosophy perspective); David A.J. Richards, Moral Philosophy
and the Searchfor FundamentalValues in ConstitutionalLaw, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 319 (1981) (analyzing the role of moral philosophy in determining fundamental constitutional values). But see Charles
Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEx. L. REV.35 (1981) (arguing that law is a subject separate from both economics and moral philosophy); Anthony T.
Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990) (arguing that the law's deference to
precedent conflicts with the independent spirit of philosophy); David Luban, Legal Traditionalism,
43 STAN. L. REv. 1035, 1040-60 (1991) (arguing that the law is moving away from philosophical
interpretations toward more traditional legal analysis); M.B.E. Smith, Should Lawyers Listen to Philosophers About Legal Ethics?, 9 LAW & PHIL. 67 (1990) (arguing that lawyers should not seek
assistance from philosophers on practical moral problems); Philip Soper, On the Relevance of Philosophy to Law: Reflections on Ackerman's PrivatePropertyand the Constitution, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
44 (1979) (criticizing the use of philosophy in constitutional takings cases); Christopher T. Wonnell,
Problems in the Application of PoliticalPhilosophy to Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 123 (1987) (constructing "a theory of the problems likely to be encountered in the application of political philosophies to
legal practice"); Book Note, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1144, 1145 (1984) (reviewing ETHICS, PUaLIC POLICY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Frederick Elliston & Norman Bowie eds., 1982)) ("To the extent that
applied philosophy approaches the purely philosophical end, it is not truly applied. To the extent it
approaches the other end of the continuum, it is not philosophy."); see also Luban, supra:
[Tihe pendulum among both legal academics and law students is swinging rapidly away
from the past decade's infatuation with theory drawn from other disciplines, back in the
direction of law's aboriginal grand tradition.... Mhe backlash against philosophy, and
more generally against "fancy theory," is a predictable and symptomatic response to the
dislocations of modernity.
Id at 1040.
382. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
383. Michael Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of
ConstitutionalEquality, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1729 (1989).
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action can be made only by reference to a sufficiently developed conception of substantive equality"; indeed, "explicit reference" to such a conception is "essential to a coherent analysis of affirmative action. '384 We
can see already where Rosenfeld is heading: The judicial analysis will be
wrong if it is incoherent, and the "only" way it can be coherent is to
"refer explicitly" to "a sufficiently developed" philosophical theory of
equality. Some of the philosophers next invoked to explain this theory
are Nicholas Rescher, 38 5 John Rawls, 386 Robert Nozick, 387 and Michael
38 8
Bayles.
Not surprisingly, those Justices who adopt the "correct" or "preferred" philosophical theory of equality turn out to have made the right
decision in Croson: "This analysis suggests that there is sound support
for Justice Marshall's position in Croson [because] a systematic and comprehensive justification for Justice Marshall's position could be formed
around a theory of substantive equality that promotes equal opportunity
and that possesses a sufficiently developed conception of it."' 389 This
raises the ante somewhat, as now the Justices must not only choose and
"refer explicitly" to the correct philosophical theory-and do so "coherently"-but also the theory itself must be "sufficiently developed" to permit of a "systematic and comprehensive" justification for the position
taken. Needless to say, this is a tough standard to meet: "[W]hen closely
examined in light of a sufficiently elaborated conception of substantive
equality... the respective positions articulated by Justices O'Connor and
Scalia seem not only inadequate but, in fundamental respects, squarely at
'390
odds with that principle.
In other words, the Croson opinions of Justices O'Connor and Scalia
are not merely "inadequate," they are dead wrong-or "not even close"
to the mark, so to speak-which is somewhat surprising since they are on
the prevailing side of a solid six-to-three majority in an area where the
Court has rarely been able to summon up even a majority, and because
"[n]otwithstanding their disagreements on several other matters, all nine
384. HL at 1777 (emphasis added).

385. NICHOLAS RESCHER, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A CONSTRUCTIVE CRITIQUE OF THE UTILITARIAN THEORY OF DISTRIBUTION (1966).
386. JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
387. ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
388. Michael Bayles, Reparationsto Wronged Groups, in REVERSE DISCRIMINATION (Barry R.
Gross ed., 1977).
389. Rosenfeld, supra note 383, at 1790-91 (emphasis added).
390. Id. at 1791 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1793 ("Assuming the enshrinement of equal
opportunity as the Constitution's accepted conception of substantive equality... Justice Marshall's
opinion can be systematically rooted and justified, while those of Justices O'Connor and Scalia cannot.") (emphasis added).
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Justices seem to agree in Croson on the proper conception of constitutional equality at the highest levels of abstraction. ' 391 Nevertheless,
viewed in light of the correct or preferred philosophical theory of equality, the disagreements concerning the standard of review "evince a failure
on the part of all the Justices to make necessary connections between
different levels of abstraction ... .-"392 Evidently, sorting out "levels of
abstraction" is not the strong suit of Supreme Court Justices, even those
who have somehow arrived at the right result, but this should not be
surprising. As explained in Part III,393 judges are not supposed to decide
abstract questions or purely theoretical issues.
Rosenfeld concludes with perhaps the most amazing proclamation
of all: "Under the.., approach suggested here... Croson appears to be
an easy case" 394-an easy case, that is, for upholding the affirmative action plan, despite the fact that it was decisively invalidated by six justices,
five of whom had just agreed for the very first time on the applicable
standard of review. "Easy" in relation to what? Evidently, not anything
having to do with constitutiofhal law or the past decade of affirmative
action jurisprudence or the actual judicial practice of the U.S. Supreme
Court. 395 It can be "easy" only as a test case of cherished philosophical
theories, and nothing more.
Rosenfeld believes that "shifting the debate over the constitutionality of affirmative action to the terrain of substantive equality... permits
a more systematic assessment of the various positions thus far advanced
in the debate. '39 6 Thus, "if one is forced out into the open to defend one's
substantive values, it seems most unlikely that the respective positions of
Justices O'Connor and Scalia in Croson ... could be reconciled with a
391.
392.
393.
394.

Id.at 1749.
Id.(emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying notes 212-35.
Rosenfeld, supra note 383, at 1792 (emphasis added).

395. In fact, Richmond's affirmative action plan presented some rather obvious difficulties. It
was promulgated in a city with a black population of about 50% and a black majority on the governing city council, included preferences for groups-such as Hispanics and Aleuts-that were unaf-

fected by discrimination in Richmond and that might actually constitute majorities elsewhere in the
country, and called for a 30% minority participation in subcontracting, as compared to the 10%

figure approved by Congress (in the exercise of its explicit enforcement powers under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment) and upheld by the Court in Fullilove. "In fact, much of the language and

reasoning in Croson reaffirmed the lesson. of Fulilove that race-conscious classifications adopted by
Congress to address racial and ethnic discrimination are subject to a different standard than such
classifications prescribed by state and local governments." Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S.
Ct. 2997, 3009 (1990). If this is an "easy" case, what would a "hard" one look like?
396. Rosenfeld, supra note 383, at 1792 (emphasis added). I earlier analyzed and criticized the
metaphor of "adjudication as a debate" in Part III(B)(2). See supra text accompanying notes 23646.
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genuine commitment to equal opportunity.

'

397

And when is the last

time a Supreme Court Justice was "forced out into the open" to "defend"-or, even more implausibly, "debate"-his or her "substantive
values"? In fact, the institution of the judiciary and the practice of adjudication are structured precisely to ensure that this does not and cannot
happen (as explained in Part 111398). But in Rosenfeld's scenario, once
the errant Justices are "forced into the terrain of substantive equality"presumably by the theory's inherent "intellectual authority" (which
judges by training and inclination are free to ignore and from time immemorial have been spectacularly successful in ignoring):
[T]he proponents of these positions would either have to invoke a conception of substantive equality that does not rely on equal opportunity-a risky proposition, given the special place held by the principle
themselves to the
of equal opportunity in the American ethos-or open
399
charge of betraying their own professed values.

A third possibility seems not to have occurred to Rosenfeld: The Justices
might say nothing and, with bemused smiles, retire silently to their
chambers to resume work on actual questions of law. In other words, the
Justices might simply decline to participate in the imaginary "debate"
over philosophical theories that Rosenfeld has concocted.
A distinctly different approach to the Croson case, one that "is not a
traditional defense or critique of the decision," has been offered by
Thomas Ross, who is simply "interested in talking about what the Justices, as storytellers, and what we, as story readers, ought to do in this
special and wrenching discourse about affirmative action." 4°° It turns
out that Ross will be talking in the distinctive cadences of abstract theory. For those willing to listen, the discourse is special and wrenching
indeed.
Consider, for example, the final sentence of Justice Scalia's Croson
opinion: "Since I believe that the appellee here had a constitutional right
to have its bid succeed or fail under a decisionmaking process uninfected
4 1 Upon first
with racial bias, I concur in the judgment of the Court."
glance, this might seem merely to be the Justice's boilerplate conclusion
summarizing his concurrence. As usual, Justice Scalia cannot agree with
anyone, so he grudgingly concurs in the judgment alone. At worst, the
sentence seems a bit awkward, with "the appellee" having been made
into an "it" that has constitutional rights, which are usually reserved for
persons (real or corporate); but this does not seem to portend anything
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.

Rosenfeld, supra note 383, at 1793 (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying notes 236-46.
Rosenfeld, supra note 383, at 1793 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEx. L. REV. 381, 381 (1989).
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 529 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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that a crash course for the Justice (or his law clerk) on, say, Strunk and
White's Elements of Style 402 (or, if more time is available, Fowler's Modern English Usage4 03) would not solve. In any event, there is little to
suggest that Justice Scalia is really trying to communicate anything here,
other than to wrap up the opinion with a restatement of the obvious and
perhaps get in one last dig at the idea of affirmative action.
For Ross, however, Justice Scalia's sentence is "a perfect composite
of the abstract and vivid." To do justice to Ross's analysis and to convey
its full flavor I must quote in full:
This sentence is abstract in several senses. First, it speaks of no names
or places. It is universal in its ostensible implications. Second, the
central and implicit assumption in this declaration is that once the bias
of the ordinance is removed no other racial bias will exist. This assumption has compelling plausibility in an abstract conception of place
and time. It becomes problematic in its real place and time. We would
not realistically suppose that the public contracting process in Richmond, Virginia, or anywhere in America, would be wholly uninfected
by racial bias once it is cleansed of the taint of affirmative action.
The last sentence of the Scalia opinion is also vivid and concrete
in its final invocation of the metaphor of affirmative action as a societal
cancer. The last sentence's proclamation of the "infection" of racial
bias connects the white reader to the metaphor of affirmative action as
the seed of our destruction. That metaphor, in turn, can take us again
to the imaginings of oppression and revenge at the hands of black citizens. By this concluding sentence, Scalia has beautifully tied together
his narrative. Scalia's narrative is one which, through its abstractions
and metaphors, invites the reader to tell his own narratives and
thereby make the abstract vivid and concrete. The individual pictorial
imagination and the nonpictorial imaginings of the cultural influences
are triggered again and again by Scalia's abstractions and metaphors.
Scalia demands of his readers that they become more than mere readers-he demands that they become storytellers as well-and we do. 4 ° 4
For Ross, it seems, there is no such thing as overexplaining the obvious.
If this single, rather unremarkable sentence of Justice Scalia is worthy of
such extended intellectual analysis and exegesis, then we should probably
consider publishing critical editions of the Justices' table talk.
4. Judges as Hermeneuticians. In recent years, legal scholars
have frequently and increasingly turned their attention to the philosophical literature on "hermeneutics'-the general theory of interpretation. 405
402. WILLIAM STRUNK JR. & E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE (1979).
403. H.W. FOWLER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH USAGE (1965).
404. Ross, supra note 400, at 404-05 (footnotes omitted).
405. See, eg., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/StatutoryInterpretation,90 COLUM. L. REV.
609, 620-21 & n.54 (1990) (discussing Hans-Georg Gadamer's view of hermeneutics); David Kennedy, Critical Theory, Structuralismand ContemporaryLegal Scholarship, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV.
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A burgeoning legal literature has developed numerous connections to
legal interpretation406 In constitutional law, for example, the debate
over "interpretivism" and "non-interpretivism" is an indirect manifestation of such interest.4°7 Statutory interpretation is another area in which
40°
legal scholars have begun making connections to hermeneutic theory.
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, the law and literature movement
may be considered an essentially "interpretive" enterprise. According to
one critic:
"[t]hese works attempt to distance their readers from the law by
minimising the coercive element in law, and then implicate the readers
in the law by treating law as a literary expression of a community consisting of law's 'writers' and its 'readers,' including the readers of this
sort of scholarship." 4°9
209, 229 n.51 (1985-1986); Michael S.Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for
the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REv. 871, 920 & nn.202-03, 923-27 & nn.226-48 (1989) (critiquing the use
of philosophical hermeneutics as a practical interpretive method); Dennis M. Patterson, Wittgenstein
and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith Performanceand Enforcement Under Article Nine, 137 U.
PA. L. REv. 335, 369 n.109 (1988) (discussing Hirsch's critique of Gadamer's hermeneutics).
406. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 n.2 (1986); Martha
Minow, InterpretingRights: An Essayfor Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1861 nn.2-3 (1987).
407. See GUNTHER, supra note 369, at 20 n.9, 528-29 nn.10-11; GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 759-68 (2d ed. 1991); Brest, supra note 380; Moore, supra note 405, at 873
& n.5.
408. See e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1050-52 & nn.14-16 (1991)
(citing examples of recent works on judicial interpretation of statutes based on established theories of
interpretation); Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretationof Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50
CORNELL L.Q. 161 (1965) (observing that notwithstanding the Parol Evidence rule, judges interpreting language always use extrinsic evidence in the form of their own experiences and views); Charles
P. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation,3 VAND. L. Rlv. 407 (1950) (arguing that legislative history is of limited value compared with traditional cannons of statutory interpretation); William N. Eskridge, Jr., DynamicStatutory Interpretation,135 U. PA. L. RaV. 1479 (1987) (endorsing
dynamic statutory interpretation in which the interpreter weighs current policy considerations more
heavily than legislative history); Eskridge, supra note 405 (applying Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutic theory of interpretation to statutory material); Walter B. Michaels, Against Formalism: The
Autonomous Text in Legal and LiteraryInterpretation, 1 POETICS TODAY 23 (1979) (arguing that
pure formalism does not exist because the process of reading itself involves use of extrinsic evidence
in the form of the reader's preconceptions concerning the meaning of language), Geoffrey P. Miller,
Pragmaticsand the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1179 (examining the continued
utility of historical and linguistic principles of interpretation in judicial analysis of statutes); Daniel
B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CAL. L. REv. 919, 928-29 & nn.50-61
(1989) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988)) (describing statutory
interpretation within the authors' New Legal Process theory and criticizing the authors' dynamic
statutory interpretation as disjunctive).
409. Tushnet, supra note 8, at 815; see also Robert M. Cover, supra note 406, at 1602 n.2 ("The
violent side of law and its connection to interpretation and rhetoric is systematically ignored or
underplayed."); Robert Weisberg, The Law-Literature Enterprise, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1988)
("[Miuch of the law-literature scholarship has produced skimpy intellectual results because it combines overly conventional readings of literature with a complacent understanding of law.").
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Robert Cover's Nomos and Narrative is a justly celebrated meditation on "the problem of 'meaning' in law-of legal hermeneutics or interpretation. ' 4 10 Cover's analysis brings him to a "simple and very
disturbing" conclusion: "[T]here is a radical dichotomy between the social organization of law as power and the organization of law as meaning." 4 1' In his own way, Cover keenly recognizes what I have analyzed
as the displacement of intellectual authority by institutional authority:
"The position that only the state creates law ... confuses the status of
interpretation with the status of political domination. '4 12 In fact, "from
a position that starts as neutral.., in its understanding of law, the interpretations offered by judges are not necessarily superior, '4 13 because "the
commitment of judges [is] to the hierarchical ordering of authority first,
4 14
and to interpretive integrity only later."
Cover acknowledges that he has "played out a fantasy to some extent" in focusing on "an imaginary world in which violence played no
part in life [and] law would indeed grow exclusively from the hermeneutic impulse-the human need to create and interpret texts. ' 41 5 He nevertheless holds out hope in the real world-precisely where I have seen
none: "The challenge presented by the absence of a single, 'objective'
interpretation is... the need to maintain a sense of legal meaning despite
the destruction of any pretense of superiority of one nomos over another. '41 6 Cover seeks to meet this challenge by encouraging courts to
articulate in greater depth and detail their "interpretive stance" and hermeneutic principles; that is, to "elaborat[e] the institutional privilege of
force, ' 4 17 "articulat[e] the constitutional mandate, '418 and "express...
41 9
judicial commitment to principle."
A similar but rather more extreme proposal has been advanced by
William Eskridge. 420 Eskridge seems to suggest not merely that judges
should express or articulate their underlying hermeneutical principles,
but also that they should adopt and apply those hermeneutic principles
410. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARv. L. REv. 4, 6 (1983); see also Cover, supra note 406; Robert Garet, Meaning and Ending, 96
YALE L.J. 1801 (1987); Joseph Lukinsky, Law in Education: A Reminiscence with Some Footnotes to
Robert Cover's Nomos and Narrative, 96 YALE L.J. 1836 (1987).
411. Cover, supra note 410, at 18.
412. Id. at 43.
413. Id. at 29.
414. Id. at 58.

415. Id. at 40.
416. Id. at 44.
417. IJd at 63.
418. Id. at 54.

419. Id, at 66-67.
420. Eskridge, supra note 405.
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that Eskridge endorses, namely, those of the German philosopher HansGeorg Gadamer. As a former student of Professor Gadamer, I should be
more than happy to see his ideas fruitfully applied to the study of legal
interpretation. "The trouble is, as so often in philosophy, it is hard to
improve intelligibility while retaining the excitement." 421
Eskridge concedes at the outset that Gadamer's main work, Truth
andMethod, "may seem a very strange book to many American lawyers.
Although interested in legal hermeneutics, Gadamer is very much a philosopher and historian and very much not a lawyer."42 2 Nevertheless,
after a lengthy analysis, Eskridge concludes that it is safe to "[a]ssum[e]
that Gadamer's hermeneutics represents a robust theory of interpretation
42 3
and that his hermeneutics is applicable to statutory interpretation"
(which sounds like a lot to assume). On this basis Eskridge proceeds to
elaborate "implications ... for theories of statutory interpretation." 424
For Eskridge, various judges and Justices espouse and represent hermeneutical "theories" much as scholars and other theorists do. For example, there is "a 'textualist' approach, associated with Justice Scalia...
an 'archaeological' [approach] recently associated with Judge Posner,
[and a] 'present-minded' approach . . . developed by Professor
Aleinikoff." 425 In fact, when they are not busy judging, judges and Justices are arguing and debating "general theories" of statutory
interpretation:
Most of the general theorizing about statutory intbrpretation is an effort to assert the primacy of one method or another for interpreting
statutes. The debate in the 1980s saw Justice Scalia argue for textualism, as the only method consistent with the formal structures of the
legislative process; Judge Posner argue for imaginative reconstruction,
as the most uncontroversial evidence of what a directive utterance
means; and Aleinikoff argue for a present-minded approach, as leading
to the most sensible policy results .... [A] careful reading of these
apparentlyfoundationalisttheorists indicates that they ought to be,426
and
probably are, amenable to Gadamerian analysis of their theories.
In Justice Scalia's case, for example, "Gadamer would find such a 'textualist' approach curious, ' 427 because "Gadamer's hermeneutics suggests
that even the most avid textualist will not be able to avoid the influence
421. Donald Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH
183 (1986).
422. Eskridge, supra note 405, at 615.
423. Id. at 637.
424. Id. at 638.
425. Id. at 610-11.
426. Id. at 638 (emphasis added).
427. Id.

AND INTERPRETATION
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of contextual considerations Justice Scalia denounces." 428 In light of the
proven philosophical superiority of Gadamerian hermeneutics, it is
highly recommended that Justice Scalia change his ways: "In short, textualism alone cannot provide the interpretive closure usually expected of
foundationalist theories, and it is to be hoped that even Justice Scalia
would recognize that."4 29 Eskridge's guiding assumption seems to be
that Justice Scalia would be a better Justice if he had a better "general
theory" of hermeneutics. As I have argued -in detail above,4 30 this assumption and its underlyingpremise of intellectual authority for the judiciary are highly questionable.
What the judicial articulation of hermeneutic principles means may
best be seen in the context of a specific case. In Bob Jones University v.
United States,43 1 the Court held that a religious but racially discriminatory university did not qualify as a tax-exempt organization under the
Internal Revenue Code, and that contributions to such a university were
not deductible as charitable contributions. 432 Cover acknowledges in his
Foreword that "[n]either the text of the Code nor the legislative history
..
seemed to compel [that] interpretation. '43 3 Justice Rehnquist, writing in dissent, criticized the Court for holding as it did in the absence of
congressional legislation. 434 Cover, however, criticizes the Court for
"avoid[ing] the question whether Congress could constitutionally grant
tax exemption to a school that discriminates on the basis of race. ' 435 (So
much for "judicial restraint.")
As for the issues the Court did reach, Chief Justice Burger wrote:
Given the stress and anguish of the history of efforts to escape from the
shackles of the "separate but equal" doctrine it cannot be said that
educational institutions that, for whatever reasons, practice racial discrimination, are institutions exercising "beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life," or should be encouraged by having all
taxpayers share in their support by way of special tax status.436
According to Cover, "the force of the Court's interpretation... is very
weak," because "the Court makes no interpretive gesture at all, save the
quintessential gesture to the jurisdictional canons: the statement that an
428. Id. at 639.
429. Id at 641.
430. See supra text accompanying notes 420-26.
431. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
432. Id. at 598-99.
433. Cover, supra note 410, at 63-64 (footnote omitted).
434. Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. at 612 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
435. Cover, supra note 410, at 66.
436. Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. at 595 (citation omitted).
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exercise of political authority was not unconstitutional. '4 37 But, contrary to Cover's suggestions, the Court canvassed some twenty-five cases,
legislative enactments, and executive orders before reaching the conclusion quoted above. The Court specifically cites and discusses Plessy v.
Ferguson,438 Brown v. Board of Education,4 39 Cooper v. Aaron, 440 and
other cases to support its conclusion:
Over the past quarter of a century, every pronouncement of this Court
and myriad Acts of Congress and Executive Orders attest a firm na-

tional policy to prohibit racial segregation and discrimination in public
education.
An unbroken line of cases following Brown v. Board of Education
establishes beyond doubt this Court's view that racial discrimination in
education violates a most fundamental national public policy, as well
as rights of individuals. 44 1
The Court cites and discusses the Civil Rights Act of 1964 44 2and numerous other acts of Congress to support its conclusion that Congress has
"clearly expressed its agreement that racial discrimination in education
violates a fundamental public policy." 44 3 The Court also cites and discusses executive orders dating back to the Truman, Eisenhower, and
Kennedy administrations, as "but a few of numerous Executive Orders
over the past three decades demonstrating the commitment of the Executive Branch to the fundamental policy of eliminating racial discrimination." 444 Yet, according to Cover, "[t]he grand national travail against
discrimination is given no normative status in the Court's opinion, save
' 44 5
that it means the IRS was not wrong. "
Surprisingly, for Cover, both sides in the Bob Jones University case
"are right to be dissatisfied" with the Court's opinion' 44 6 "The Amish,
the Mennonites, and all insular communities, whatever their stand on
race," and regardless of whether they were involved in the case, "deserved a constitutional hedge against mere administration." 44 7 Similarly,
the "winners" in the case, "the minority community deserved more-it
deserved a constitutional commitment to avoiding public subsidization of
437. Cover, supra note 410, at 66.

438. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
358 U.S. 1 (1958).
Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. at 593.
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. at 594.
Id. at 595.
Cover, supra note 410, at 66.

446. Id.
447. Id. at 66-67 (emphasis added).
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racism."448 Cover fails to explain how these apparently conflicting demands are to be satisfied, but he does hint that it would involve an "inter'4 50
pretive gesture," 449 "the articulation of the constitutional mandate,
and "the expression of judicial commitment to principle that is embodied
in constitutional decision. ' 45 1 Apparently, by elaborating its interpretive
principles in more compelling ways, the Court would make both sides in
the case more satisfied-simultaneously! The losers would have a more
edifying explanation of why they should indeed have lost, and the winners would have more of a commitment from the Court to celebrate.
In a final footnote to Nomos and Narrative, Cover divulges that
"[s]uch a commitment would necessarily have invited a host of
problems" and would entail "massive potential change. '4 52 "But," he
cheerily adds, "that is as it should be."' 45 3 With the proper interpretive
commitment from the Court, "we would soon be asking [questions involving] distinctions that can plausibly be drawn among the various
cases" Cover has put, as well as "hundreds of others that might be
put. ' 454 But not to worry: "The Court could not and would not have
had to decide all those cases now, '455 although a Coverian approach to
Bob Jones University "would certainly have invited an early encounter
'45 6
with them.
Cover has very high hopes for the quality of judicial and legal dialogue-hopes that, as I have demonstrated throughout this Article, are
not justified by the current practice of adjudication or by any suggestions
of intellectual authority on the part of the judiciary. But even if the judicial elaboration of interpretive principles he envisages were somehow to
emerge, it is not at all clear that it would not bring with it far more
problems than it solves. I have alluded to some of the more obvious
difficulties above, 457 and I previously discussed the divergence of legal
theory and judicial practice as equally untenable gravitations toward the
worst possible extremes of an opposition, with legal theorists taking an
impossibly high road and judicial practice firmly in control of the low
ground. Robert Cover's vision, rich and evocative though it was, left the
448. I at 67.
449. Id. at 66.

450. Id.
451.
452.
453.
454.

Id. at 66-67.
Id. at 67 n.195.
Id.
Id.

455. Id.
456. Id
457. See supra text accompanying notes 431-56.
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basic opposition between intellectual authority and institutional authority unresolved. And since his time, there is every reason to think that it
has grown even more intractable.
V.

CONCLUSION:

THE "ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE"

IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

There is a real "anxiety of influence" in the law, but it is an anxiety
not of judges or judicial decisionmaking or opinion-writing, but of legal
scholars. These are the true "poets" of our profession-to the extent that
it has any at all-and they are, like me, anxious'to propound bold new
theories, to cast off the smothering mantle of their predecessors, and to
make a name for themselves in the larger world of the law. The plodding, stodgy analyses of judges and doctrinal scholars make the perfect
foil for critical, creative legal scholars; but it is scholars from other disciplines who induce the anxiety.
It is the imperfectly assimilated methodology of the humanities that
suggests judicial opinions can be made to yield up a rich, romantic, and
evocative ore of systematic primary learning and original, theoretical
wisdom. In seeking to make that humanistic connection, legal scholars
seek the legitimizing aura of established intellectual authority to grace
their efforts. No doubt, if judicial opinions had been written by poets and
philosophers, they would merit critical comparison with the primary
sources of those disciplines. Unfortunately, they are written under the
severe pragmatic constraints of a most unusual social and historical institution that necessarily values institutional authority over true intellectual
authority. Humanistic-style legal theorizing, which takes judicial opinions as its underlying basis, is thus limited by the inherently modest and
rapidly dwindling claims that the work-product of the judiciary can
make on our intellect. The willful disregard of these inherent limitations
of legal method can be explained by an "anxiety of influence" notion, but
it cannot be so justified.
These limitations do not, however, necessarily affect the discipline
that is pointing them out. The true realm and mdtier of legal scholarship, like that of all scholarship, is the world of ideas. It bears approximately the same relationship to adjudication that poetry bears to nursery
rhymes. The real, empirical world falls under the stem rule of physical
causality and various forms of psychic determinism. Its dumbfounding
array of unpleasantries includes incomprehensibly petty politics, intractable social and institutional structures that apparently bear no necessary
relationship to anything, and all the old, familiar, immutable patterns of
human development and behavior. Here it seems awkward and difficult
to speak of being "free" in any important sense.
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In the world of ideas, by contrast, everything appears bright, clean,
pure, and potentially perfect. It is the world of Euclid's geometry at the
dawn of creation, and everything serenely awaits the discovering, revealing, and redeeming articulation of a powerful mind.45 8 Within this
realm, the scholar is free to soar as high and as far as native intelligence
and imagination permit, for these alone are the coin of the realm. Intellectual merit is always immediately recognized in the world of ideas;
time, and the often interminable delays that separate greatness from its
recognition, exist only in the real world and are therefore not calculated.
"[T]he voices in the Great Conversation tend more and more to speak in
the present tense, as if all the authors were contemporaneous with one
another, responding directly to each other's thought. '459 Institutional
authority carries no weight at all here; the only "laws" to speak of are the
laws of logic and reason. Notions like "compulsion" and "authority"
have meaning only in the context of more or less "compelling" or "powerful" arguments, 460 "[flor liberty of action and thought alone is capable
'46 1
of producing great things.
If things seem palpably otherwise it is because we are, despite ourselves, really unable to conceive of such a world. We are constantly importing into that realm obstacles and extraneous factors derived from the
real world. But the "world of ideas" and true intellectual authority-as
ideals-serve as indispensable desiderata for the scholar and provide the
common measure that unites such apparently diverse enterprises as poetry, philosophy, and legal scholarship. 462

458. See KoYR9, supra note 107:
Nothing illustrates better Descartes', lack of concern for the traditional theories than
the fact that he gives The World the form of a fiction: he is not undertaking to describe our
own world, he explains, but a quite different one, a world created by God, infinitely remote
from ours, somewhere in imaginary space; and created, one might say, with the means to
hand. Therefore Descartes does not undertake to explain the laws of our world; quite the
contrary, he intends to deduce the laws of that other world, the laws which God imposes
on nature and by means of which he will create all the variety and multiplicity of objects
which will be found in that other world.
We said that this is a fiction, a joke. So it is, because in fact it is our own world that
Descartes is planning to reconstruct. But this device reveals an attitude which is typical of
Descartes; for he does not actually ask questions about our own world. iHe does not ask, as
Galileo had done, what nature's way of acting actually is. What Descartes asks is something different: it is, one could say, what way of acting must nature adopt?
Id. at 251-52 (footnote omitted); see also Bork Hearings, supra note 12, at 2441-42 (statement of
George L. Priest).
459. HUTCHINS, supra note 86, at 79.

460. Cf FRANcIs BACON, THE NEW ORGANON 41 (Fulton H. Anderson ed., 1960) ("The syllogism ... commands assent ... to the proposition, but does not take hold of the thing.").

461.

JEAN L. D'ALEMBERT, PRELIMINARY DIsCouRsE TO THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DIDEROT

62 (Richard Schwab trans., 1963).
462. See STANLEY FISH, Profession Despise Thyself: FearandSelf-Loathing in LiteraryStudies,
in DOING WHAT COMEs NATURALLY 197 (1989):
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HUMANISTIC THEORY IN LAW

[What is being demanded is a procedural purity that matches, in the sense of being answerable to, the presumed purity of the enterprise. That is, if literary works are produced
in a realm far removed from the pressures and temptations of the everyday world-the
world of commerce, competition, and politics-the business (not really a business at all) of
honoring and explicating those works should be similarly removed, at least insofar as is
possible.
Id. at 198. I use this quotation advisedly; of course, Fish wants to caricature the notion that literary
works are produced "in a realm far removed from the pressures and temptations of the everyday
world." But, in some deep sense, that is precisely where great works of the literary and legal imagination originate. See, eg., Philippe Nonet, Reply, 100 YALE L.J. 723 (1990). This is not to deny
that the subjects of literary or legal interest may be found in the most lowly, ordinary, grimy settings
imaginable. Nevertheless, intellectual greatness may be understood precisely as the ability to rise
somehow above the grimy details and see them from a universal perspective, or to set them in rela-

tion to enduring (if not eternal) human concerns. See, eg., HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (1964); FYODOR DosroEvsKY, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT (1866); ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959);
VICTOR HUGO, LES MistRABLES (1862); FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (1925); JOHN STEINBECK,
THE GRAPES OF WRATH (1939). The fact that this is so difficult merely explains why it is so rare.
In that sense, the critical, intellectual, and scholarly enterprise does have the redeeming "purity"
Fish disparages. For further discussion of these issues, see Charles W. Collier, IntellectualAuthority
and InstitutionalAuthority, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. (forthcoming 1992).

